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I. INTRODUCTION
The term "state equitable apportionment" may seem a curious one
to many students of western water rights law. Equitable apportionment, after all, is generally thought of as the formula used by the
United States Supreme Court to resolve interstate water disputes.1
The phrase is also familiar in connection with international water reProfessor of Law, University of California at Davis. A.B., 1960, Dartmouth College; LL.B., 1964, Harvard University. The research assistance of Kathleen Faubion of the Class of 1987 and Timothy McNulty of the Class of 1988 at the
University of California at Davis School of Law is gratefully acknowledged.
1. A recent review of this body of federal common law is provided in Tarlock, The
Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated, and Restated, 56 U. COLO.
L. REV. 381 (1985). References to equitable apportionment are also common
when interstate water controversies are settled by interstate compact. Grant, The
*
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sources conflicts. 2 Intrastate controversies, however, are usually decided according to the doctrine of prior appropriation,3 which in the
state law of the West has largely superceded the riparianism of the
earlier common law.4 Priority, not equity,5 is thus commonly regarded as the paramount consideration when domestic water controversies are decided in the West.
Prior appropriation, however, presents many difficulties,6 even in
its twentieth century form in which state administration is a prominent feature. One of the most serious problems arises when a source
of water is either over appropriated or fully appropriated, thus respectively limiting existing uses with junior rights or precluding the initiation of new uses.
Typically in the West, when this has occurred, the response has
been to expand the water supply in the source, 7 for example, by providing seasonal storage of water or by an interbasin transfer of water.

2.

3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

FutureoflnterstateAllocationof Water, 29 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 977, 989-93
(1984).
Utton, Sporhase, El Paso, and the Unilateral Allocation of Water Resources:
Some Reflections on Internationaland InterstateGroundwaterLaw, 57 U. COLO.
L. REv. 549, 550 (1986). In international law the term "equitable utilization" is
also used frequently, e.g., Lipper, Equitable Utilization,in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BAsINs 15, 23-28 (A. Garretson, R. Hayton & C. Olmstead eds.
1967).
An overview of the prior appropriation doctrine as it applies to western surface
waters can be found in 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS (R. Clark ed. 1972).
See infra text accompanying notes 22-26 for a discussion of this process.
"Equity" is used here and throughout this Article to signify an attempt fairly to
share limited water resources, often by taking into consideration many factors.
"Priority," by way of contrast, is used to suggest an absence of pro rata sharing
and a refusal to consider factors other than the temporal sequence in which water
from a source is put to beneficial use. I recognize that for some to follow the
priority principle is necessarily to do equity.
In addition to its tendency to lead to overappropriation, discussed in detail infra
in the text accompanying notes 48-83, prior appropriation tends to produce great
disparities between paper rights and actual rights, McIntire, The DisparityBetween State Water Rights Records and Actual Water Use Patterns, "I Wonder
Where the Water Went?" 5 LAND & WATER L. REV. 23 (1970); to create inflexibility as to place-of-use once an initial allocation takes place, infra note 28; to foster
premature development and ignore marginal productivity, Gaffney, EconomicAspects of Water Resources Policy, 28 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 131 (1969); and to be
difficult to apply to stored water, particularly that found in aquifers. Corker, Inadequacy of the PresentLaw to Protect, Conserve and Develop GroundwaterUse,
25 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 23-1, 23-12 (1979); Haase, The Interrelationshipof
Ground and Surface Water: An Enigma to Western Water Law, 10 Sw. U.L.
REv. 2069 (1978). The prior appropriation rule that a "futile" call will not be
honored, i.e. that a senior cannot restrict use by a junior unless the restriction
will work to the senior's material advantage, is particularly problematic in the
case of groundwater. See id. at 2084-85.
A fascinating recent interpretation of this response is D. WORSTER, RIVERS OF
EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, AND THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1985). See
also M. REISNER, CADILLAc DESERT (1986).
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Water projects today, however, have for several reasons become much
more difficult to construct.8 Consequently, the emphasis has shifted to
better management of our developed water supply, and the existing
western prior appropriation system is being subjected to intensifying
scrutiny. 9 Discussion of "water marketing" is much in the air,10 as are
other means for promoting increased efficiency in the use of water. 1
Most of the contemporary discussion assumes the validity and continued dominance of prior appropriation as the most desirable doctrine to use in allocation of scarce western water resources. As time
goes on and the difficulties created by adherence to priority become
more apparent, however, I believe the significance of equitable considerations is likely to increase. There is some precedent for state equitable apportionment, and as the pressures on the prior appropriation
system become greater, this precedent should be of increasing interest.
In this Article, I shall first review some aspects of early western
water allocation, particularly the way in which riparianism was initially superceded by prior appropriation and the justification then and
now for the no-sharing rule of prior appropriation. Contemporary difficulties of overappropriation will then be discussed, as will conventional state responses to overappropriation. I then analyze several
examples from California of state equitable apportionment, which I
view as an unconventional but important response to overappropriation in western states, and offer equitable interpretations of two wellknown federal water law decisions.
II.

EARLY WESTERN WATER ALLOCATION

The distinctive characteristics of early western water rights law
were developed against a backdrop of the common law system found
in the eastern states, 12 a riparianism which included three important
elements. First, water rights were thought to inhere in rights to
land'3.-indeed, it is somewhat misleading to use the term "water
right" in reference to riparianism, since the use of water found sitting
on or crossing one's land was but one of many resource utilization prerogatives acknowledged as belonging to the landowner. The owner of
8. See infra text accompanying notes 91-92.
9. See, e.g., Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition,56 U.CoLO. L. REv. 317

(1985).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 95-97.

11. Discussion of one efficiency-oriented alternative to water marketing is provided
in Dunning, The "PhysicalSolution"in Western Water Law, 57 U. COLO. L. REV.
445 (1986).
12. An overview of this system is provided by Davis, The Right to Use Water in the
Eastern States in 7 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 27 (R.Clark ed. 1976). The origins of riparianism have been the subject of lively academic discussion. Id at 2934.
13. J. SAx & R. ABRAMs, LEGAL CONTROLS OF WATER RESOURCES 154 (1986).
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land had a right to use the water just as he had a right to the soil, the
trees, the minerals, and any other natural resources found in his domain, so the "water right" was really but one of the many elements in
the owner's proverbial "bundle of sticks."
Secondly, as the name suggests, 14 riparianism preferred those landowners with parcels adjacent to the water course. These were the persons with immediate access to the resource, and in a time of
widespread resource availability and extensive settlement along rivers, there was apparently little concern that this preference unduly
limited the class of claimants. Furthermore, those with riparian status
were in principle allowed to use water from their land only on the
riparian parcel itself,15 and in some states only to the extent that the
parcel fell within the watershed drained by the stream in question.16
These rules on place-of-use were highly restrictive, although in appropriate circumstances riparian jurisdictions have been able to find ways
to permit a water supply to be developed for those municipalities and
others excluded from claiming as riparians.17
Finally, the riparian system of the recent common law provided for
a sharing rule for the preferred group of riparian landowners. Initially, there was no sharing for consumptive uses, at least to the extent
upstream users were in fact required to ensure that those below received the "natural flow" of water undiminished in quantity or quality.' 8 But early on, riparian jurisdictions began to switch to the
"reasonable use" variant of riparianism' 9 which permitted each ripa14. "Riparian" is derived from "ripa," the latin word for the banks of a river. 78 AM.
Jur.2d Waters § 260 (1975).
15. Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the East-A Programfor Reform, 24 Wm.&
MARY L. REV.547, 548-49 (1983) (describes alternative definitions of the riparian
parcel).
16. Special Project, Limitation on Diversionfrom the Watershed. RiparianRoadblock to Beneficial Use, 23 S.C.L. REv.43 (1971).
17. One means has been to permit certain nonriparian uses by riparian proprietors.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 855 (1979). Others have been condemnation,
Harnsberger, Eminent Domain and Water, 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS (R.
Clark ed. 1970), and the replacement of common law riparianism with statutory
systems. Ausness, supra note 15. Although through such means riparian jurisdictions have allowed for major water projects-including some which cross basin
lines, Abrams, Interbasin Transferin a RiparianJurisdiction,24 Wm.& MARY
L. REv. 591 (1983)-it appears in these jurisdictions further institutional modifications may be necessary to provide adequate water supplies in time of drought.
Gellis, Water Supply in the Northeast: A Study in Regulatory Failure,12 ECoLOGY L.Q. 429 (1985).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850 (1979) (introductory note) (statement of
natural flow theory); but see Davis, supra note 12, at 611 (no jurisdiction protected right of a riparian nonuser to the full natural flow).
19. Although many take this transition as an important doctrinal evolution, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850 (1979) (introductory note), others argue
that the two doctrines are intertwined. Thus "even when diversions are permitted under reasonable-use principles, the natural-flow doctrine persists and may
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rian landowner a reasonable share of the resource. "Reasonable" was
determined by examination of a range of factors, 20 and courts indicated that reasonable share allocations could change over time as circumstances changed.21 Thus, some degree of stability was sacrificed
for flexibility in the resource allocation system, which provided a
built-in mechanism to respond to new needs.
When courts in the western states began to develop their rules on
water allocation, there was little careful analysis of the various elements of riparianism or detailed consideration of which were suitable
and which unsuitable in the circumstances of a largely arid region.
Rather the initial debate was whether to follow the natural flow tenets of the common law,22 and even in the earliest decisions, the courts
largely forfeited the opportunity for conscious choice in terms of desirable natural resource allocation and allowed the decision to be dicsupport a riparian's right to a minimum flow or a minimum level." Davis, supra
note 12, at 36. The author observes that whereas appropriative rights "are measured by what is taken," the riparian right of reasonable use is measured "by
what is left or should be left in the waterbody." Id.
20. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979). Typically the reasonable riparian use is subject to the right of an individual riparian landowner to take for
domestic use water "sufficient to satisfy natural wants" such as washing, drinking
and watering livestock. Davis, supra note 12, at 78.
21. See Davis, supra note 12, at 65-67.
22. The leading case from California eschewed common law riparianism not because
it was inappropriate for the region, but because it was thought not applicable
where the competing water users on the federal public domain could claim at
most to be tenants at will of the land. "It is certain that at the common law the
diversion of water courses could only be complained of by riparian owners, who
were deprived of the use, or those claiming directly under them." Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 145-46 (1855). Nonetheless the court was charged then and later
with judicial legislation. G. YALE, LEGAL TITLES TO MINING CLA iS AND WATER
RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA, UNDER THE MINING LAw OF CONGRESS, OF JULY, 1866, at

136-38 (1867). It responded that in all its decisions on private rights to the public
domain, including those on water, "we have applied simply the rules of the common law.... [Me claim that we have neither modified its rules, nor have we
attempted to legislate upon any pretended ground of their insufficiency." Conger
v. Weaver, 6 Cal. 548, 555 (1856). Rather, the court said new conditions had produced a "novel application" of an established rule. Id. at 555-56. The rule that the
court had in mind was that a grant may be presumed from long possession in
order to quiet the title of the possessor, id. at 556, and presumably the novelty
arose from the fact the possession was of rather short duration. Shortly after
Conger it was suggested that to argue for prior appropriation as an application of
the common law in modified form to suit new conditions would be "a disastrous
failure." G. YALE, supra, at 138. A recent commentary argues that in fact the
California court in its early public domain water decisions simply applied the conventional common law rule of relative title, which protected anyone with prior
peaceable possession against all but the true owner. Freyfogle, Lux v. Haggin
and the Common Law Burdens of Modern Water Law, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 485,
505-06 (1986). On this theory Irwin was perhaps less novel than the California
court believed it to be.
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tated by their understanding of customary practices. 23
The first cases came from the gold mining regions of California,
where the miners treated priority of possession or control as the key
element in deciding among themselves who had the better right to
mining claims or to the water needed to work those claims.24 When
the question of the legitimacy of this method of allocation with regard
to water was raised in the courts, the system was approved in large
part simply because it had become the established custom of the miners. Implied federal approval and explicit state approval was found
for the mining on federal land which had "been permitted to grow up
by the voluntary action and assent of the population." 25 This activity
included "the right to divert the streams from their natural channels"
and to conduct water wherever needed for mining.26
The miners' system, which came to be known as "prior appropriation," differed considerably from common law riparianism. First, it
was the act of putting water to use rather than the status of landowner
which was the foundation for the appropriative right, which could
truly be termed a "water right" entirely distinct from any land right.
Water thus was allocated as a natural resource independent from
land,27 although in practice often this was true only for the initial
28
allocation.
23. The Colorado court, in adopting prior appropriation many years after California,
exhibited a much more policy-oriented approach, which in fact seemed to distort
the riparian thrust of the Colorado statutes. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6
Colo. 443 (1882); see also Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551 (1872).
24. Indeed, in the first few years after the discovery of gold in 1848, "much of the
California public assumed that water rights were synonymous with mining
rights." Littlefield, Water Rights During the California Gold Rusk- Conflicts
over Economic Points of View, 14 W. HIsT. Q. 415, 434 (1983).
25. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 146 (1855). In addition to certain revenue provisions
treated in Irwin as evidence of explicit state approval, the Civil Practice Act of
1851 provided that in Justices' Courts mining customs not in conflict with the
constitution or statutes were to govern the decision. G. YALE, supra note 22, at
59-60.
26. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 147 (1855). Ironically, although the opinion in Irwin
purported to defer entirely to mining customs, the miners' committee that originally heard the case ruled for the junior appropriator. Littlefield, supra note 24,
at 431. The committee's theory apparently was that the senior appropriator, who
was involved in the transport and sale of water to miners rather than in mining
activity, did not have a right superior to those like the junior appropriator who
sought the water for mining purposes in the bed of the stream. Id at 430-31. In
reality Irwin was thus more a decision that "water rights were separate and distinct from mining rights," id- at 434, than one affirming the primacy of mining
customs.
27. The right to divert gives a right to use present and future flows, as water unlike
minerals is a renewable natural resource.
28. Once water was put to use, frequently a new water-land bond developed, insofar
as various rules made it difficult or impossible to change the use of the water
from the place of first use. The most important of these rules provides that the
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Secondly, appropriators of water could establish and maintain their
rights only if more-or-less continuous and beneficial use existed. As
later frequently stated in statutes and constitutions throughout the
West, beneficial use is "the origin, the measure and the limit" of the
appropriative right.29 Whereas riparian status serves to designate the
preferred category of landowners in the older common law system,
continuing beneficial use defines the preferred group of claimants in
the new system. By tying the property right to resource utilization,
the appropriation system in principle precludes any prolonged period
of dormancy for the water right.
Finally, and of greatest significance for this Article, the prior appropriation approach provides that among beneficial users of water
there is to be no sharing of shortages. Temporal priority-"first-intime, first-in-right"-is the rule, which means in time of shortage
claimants are cut back in inverse order of priority. The most junior
claimant thus is entirely deprived of water before the next most junior
claimant loses any water, and so forth backward through the list of
appropriators. This "no sharing of shortage" rule stands in stark contrast to the "reasonable use" sharing rule of riparianism.
The justification for the no-sharing rule of prior appropriationeither in the 1850s or today-is elusive. Abandonment of the natural
flow and place-of-use restrictions of riparianism appear to have been
mandatory in most of the West, given the limited supplies of water
available and the frequent distance of those supplies from valuable
mineral deposits or-later-from arable lands and growing cities. 3 0
But it is not as clear why in the West the impact of drought should fall
change may not injure another holder of a water right, even one junior in priority. In general, the prior appropriation doctrine "tends to 'freeze' a specific quantity of water to a specific tract of land." Hutchins & Steele, Basic Water Rights
Doctrines and Their Implicationsfor River Basin Development, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 276, 292 (1957). This tendency has been most pronounced where
water rights are explicitly made appurtenant to the lands for which they are first
acquired. Dunning, supra note 11, at 469-70.
29. See, e.g., N.M. CONsT. art. XVI, § 3. Here the rules for water again follow the
rules for mining, at least to the extent some minimal exploitation is required in
order to maintain an unpatented mining claim on public lands. Turner & Sherwood, Rights Conferred by Location, 2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING §§ 7.1-7.5
(1983); cf.G. YALE, supra note 22, at 81. A study of the Wyoming situation found,
however, that often the initial proofs of water use were inaccurate, McIntire,
supra note 6, at 23-24; that records were not maintained as to whether beneficial
use continued, as required in theory, id. at 25; and that, where the paper right
was known to exceed actual beneficial use, the relevant state official lacked the
authority to initiate forfeiture proceedings. Id.at 33. It appears this same situation exists in most western states. Id at 26.
30. "In a dry and thirsty land it is necessary to divert the waters of streams from
their natural channels, in order to obtain the fruits of the soil, and this necessity
is so universal and imperious that it claims recognition of the law." Yunker v.
Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 553 (1872).
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disproportionately on those who most recently began to utilize water
resources.
One historical explanation for the no-sharing-of-shortage rule of
prior appropriation is simply that miners treated water like gold and
there was no sharing of the mineral resource. The first to begin exploitation of a mining claim was entitled to pursue that claim to the
exclusion of others.31
Applying to water the rules used for minerals ignores, of course,
the significant physical differences between the two resources. Minerals, at least those of the so-called "hardrock" type, are provided by
nature in fixed amounts at fixed locations. The resource is non-renewable, so that once removed for use there will not on our time-scale
be any further mining activity. A mining claim does not readily lend
itself to shared exploitation by independent operators, and exploitation does not normally leave behind much of interest to another user.
The allocation question to be answered by the law is, thus, to whom
should the right to engage in exclusive exploitation be granted. To say
that the first to exploit is the preferred party is not necessarily the
best response,3 2 but at least it fits with the objective of allowing someone to engage in exclusive exploitation.
The situation is rather different for water, which is typically a re31. G. YALE, supra note 22, at 78 ("first in time is first in right" applies to mining
claims with peculiar force). The mining claim is but one example of natural resource allocation by first-in-time, first-in-right, a notion which "determines the
resolution of numerous human conflicts both in law and custom." Berger, An
Analysis of the Doctrine That "Firstin Time is Firstin Right," 64 NEB. L. REV.
349, 350 (1985). The notion is said to be "grounded in something almost instinctual," id, and both the common and the civil law are said to have embraced "the
proposition that taking possession of unowned things is the only possible way to
acquire ownership of them." Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L.
REV. 1221, 1222 (1979). That proposition assumes, of course, that the mineral or
other natural resource is to be regarded as unowned when unpossessed.
32. In addition to theories based on instinct, various policies are suggested in support
of the rule of first possession. For one commentator, the most important is "the
promotion of economic efficiency through encouraging development." Berger,
supra note 31, at 388. Another offers an institutional justification: "In essence
the first possession rule has been the organizing principle of most social institutions, and the heavy burden of persuasion lies upon those who wish to displace
it." Epstein, supranote 31, at 1241. For this author the rule of first possession of
the past "has a power to bind" and vested rights have "a life of their own." Id- at
1243; cf. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DoMAIN 217 (1985) (other "very attractive utilitarian features" of the first-possession rule discussed). What in fact the rule of the past was regarding a given resource and what properly should be regarded as "vested" are open to discussion.
See generally Sax, Book Review, 53 U.Cm. L. REV. 279 (1986); Sax, Liberatingthe
Public Trust Doctrine from its HistoricalShackles, 14 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 185
(1980). It should be noted that in some cases first possession is considered the
basis of ownership, while in others it serves to establish the basis for protection
pending a claim by the owner.
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newable resource which can be exploited by several users in complementary ways. A miner can use water for washing gold ore, a farmer
can then divert that same water for irrigation, after which another
farmer can irrigate with the drainage returned to the stream by the
first farmer. Meanwhile others can enjoy the benefits of flows in the
stream, at least intermittently. In fact, multiple and successive uses
for water are necessary if the economic returns of the resource are to
be maximized. Usage by one does not usually exclude some usage by
others, so water users experience an interdependency normally absent
in mining. Exploitation is concurrent rather than exclusive, even
though one use begins at a point in time prior to another use.
Another justification of the priority rule, more attuned to economics than history, emphasizes security of investment for the resource
user. Sharing rules, it is said, 33 are inadequate because it is impossible
to know in advance what apportionment any given claimant will receive and because apportionments can change as circumstances
change. Therefore, insecurity exists and consequently needed investment of capital in water projects will be inhibited.
Unfortunately, however, the prior appropriation system does not
provide all users of the resource with equivalent security. It simply
places some in a more secure position than others, based only on who
began using the resource first. Just as the system makes early or senior users of the resource relatively more secure from the threat of
drought, it makes later or junior users concomitantly less secure. The
insecurity of the latter obviously can inhibit needed investment, perhaps fully offsetting any additional investment prompted from seniors
by advantaging them through priority rules. Or it can prompt juniors
to support overinvestment in water projects, to protect themselves
against the possible catastrophic impact of an occasional drought when
the no-sharing rule may be invoked.
Curiously, the priority principle justified as needed to ensure security of investment has usually not been used within the local water
distribution organizations which dominate western water supply to
consumers. Individual appropriators who take their supply directly
from a stream or lake are today a small minority in the West, with the
vast majority receiving water from an irrigation district, mutual water
company, or some other type of water distribution organization. 34
These organizations often either appropriate water themselves or
33. "[R]easonable use makes no sense in a situation of real shortage." Berger, supra
note 31, at 372. Where, in the East or elsewhere, there is some certainty in the
probability of normal flows, then "perhaps sharing the burden of shortage encourages further investment." Davis, supra note 12, at 111.
34. Water districts distribute about half the water used in the West. Leshy, Irrigation Districts in a Changing West-An Overview, 1982 ARIz. ST. L.J. 345, 347
(1969 data). Most of the rest is distributed by private organizations. Id- at 347
n.12.
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purchase water from some sort of wholesaler, and typically they distribute it on a utility basis to those in their service area. Customers
generally do not have temporal priorities,35 and in the event of inadequate supply, districts have great flexibility in rationing available supplies.36 Nonetheless, billions of dollars of investment have been made
in the belief that a system which includes this flexibility provides adequate security.
Another perspective on priority is provided if one notes that water
resources, although renewable and capable of reuse by interdependent
claimants, are nonetheless finite. If all users, regardless of temporal
priority or riparian landownership, had equal status, that might encourage many late-coming claimants, with the inevitable consequence
of over-taxing the limited resource. Particularly in situations where
there is no administrative mechanism to determine the quantity of the
resource available for allocation, it might reasonably be thought to be
dangerous to have a system which did not put latecomers at some disadvantage. Prior appropriation could be justified not so much as a device for providing exclusivity as one for limiting the class of claimants,
much as riparianism limits claimant landowners to those with immediate physical access to the resource.
To seek to limit the number of claimants to use of a scarce natural
resource may have utility, but the prior appropriation system in practice often failed to provide a practical limit. Simply put, in many cases
juniors were not discouraged by the apparent disadvantage of being
subsequent in time. According to the great irrigation expert Elwood
Mead, it was commonplace in earlier years for the paper claims to
water vastly to exceed the water available in the source.3 7 And even
today, with far more tightly controlled systems of water administration than previously, legitimate claims can greatly exceed supply.
Often these claims are turned into actual uses, so if disallowed considerable economic disruption would result. Such situations create pressure for courts (or agencies) to find some way to avoid the harshness
of cutting off juniors entirely while allowing seniors to have their full
entitlement.
35. Where a water distribution organization takes over a supply of previously appropriated water, typically the objective is to honor the prior rights. Special Project,
Desert Surviva: The Evolving Western IrrigationDistrict, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
377, 411. But in the case of larger districts which typically develop or contract for
a new water supply, the apportionment of water is usually linked in one way or
another to the assessed valuation of the land. Id
36. Id at 414-15.
37. E. MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 69-76 (1903). Furthermore, contrary to the
principle of beneficial use, in many of the early decisions "not only was the minimum capacity of the ditch decreed but very often the amount mentioned in the
notice [of appropriation], which might be far in excess of the maximum capacity
[of the ditch]." A. CHANDLER, ELEMENTS OF WSTERN WATER LAW 44 (1913).
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III. CONTEMPORARY OVERAPPROPRIATION
Today's western prior appropriation systems are far different from
those which developed from the customs of the gold miners, primarily
because of the introduction of a degree of governmental administration.38 In the early days, water rights were unadministered-individuals on their own initiative simply carried out the physical acts
necessary to begin water use, 39 and in case of conflict with other
claimants from the same source the only resolution was by litigation.
Lawsuits could be filed to determine priorities, to establish whether a
use was beneficial, to decide whether forfeiture had occurred from a
period of non-use, and so forth. In many areas of pressure on water
40
resources, litigation was rampant and repetitive.
38. A good account of the change from an unadministered to a partially administered
(mainly for surface water) system is provided by Lasky, From PriorAppropriation to Economic Distributionof Water by the State-Via IrrigationAdministration (pts. 1-3), 1 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 161, 248 (1929), 2 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 35
(1929). See also Ferrier, Administration of Water Rights in California,44 CAL
L. REV. 833 (1956). Lasky presents western irrigation development, particularly
in Colorado and Wyoming, as an important early example of administrative law,
with the states "in transition from various forms of extreme individualism and
vested property rights of substance in water to the same goal, the economic distribution of state-owned water by a state administrative machinery thru stategranted conditional privileges of user." Lasky, supra, 1 RocKY MTN. L. REV. at
162. Nonetheless, in general the administration of water rights in the western
states has incorporated and honored the priority principle.
39. In addition to making surveys and digging ditches, claimants customarily posted a
notice near the point of diversion. Thompson v. Lee, 8 Cal. 275, 279 (1857). As
with the digging of gold, governmental approval was presumed from the circumstances. Conger v. Weaver, 6 Cal. 548, 558 (1856). Mead greatly regretted this
early identification of water law with mining law and the failure of the federal
and state governments "to assert public control over streams and dispose of them
as a great public resource." E. MEAD, supra note 37, at 62. From time to time
proposals for public control were made which might have pleased Mead, but none
was implemented. For example, in 1874 a California assemblyman acting on behalf of members of the Grange introduced legislation which provided that "the
governor would designate all the land suited to irrigation in California, determine
the size of the state's water supply, and decide the best way to use it." D. PISANI,
FROM THE FAMILY FARM TO AGRIBUSINESS - THE IRRIGATION CRUSADE IN CALIFORNIA AND THE WEST, 1850-1931 136 (1984).

40. One example, dealing with water from the Kings River in California's San Joaquin Valley, is provided at GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA
WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL REPORT 22-24 (1978). Between 1876 and 1902, at least

103 lawsuits were filed with regard to Kings River water, id. at 22, virtually all of
them in regard to the use of water for irrigation. In addition to competition for
Kings River water for farming, there was hostility by some to any irrigation at all.
Mead reported in 1903 that "the cattlemen along King's River threatened to
lynch the first builder of a ditch on that stream." E. MEAD, supra note 37, at 186.
The Kings River was not unique, for extensive litigation over water rights was
touched off throughout the San Joaquin Valley by the canal building which followed completion in 1874 of a railroad through the Valley. D. PISANI, supra note
39, at 191.
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The introduction of administrative control brought greater order
to the situation. New appropriations, at least of surface water, required explicit rather than presumed governmental approval;41 terms
and conditions were used in some states to protect the public interest;42 and often some sort of watermaster service was implemented to
ensure that diversion facilities were actually operated in accordance
with existing priorities. 43 Another way greater orderliness was
achieved was through the development of large projects dependent for
their water supplies on the storage of flood waters for which there
were few or no competitors. These projects operate more or less above
and beyond the ordinary prior appropriation system, 44 and indeed
they often have their own system for the secondary allocation of the
large amounts of water they control. 45 Finally, even where governmental control did not develop, in some cases-usually after decades
of litigation-competitors reached comprehensive agreements which
46
established an acceptable means of operation on a river.
Despite these improvements, certain structural characteristics of
prior appropriation systems have provided the means for continued
overappropriation of water resources, so that an established user can
suddenly find himself in a junior position without a dependable water
supply even in normal water years. Four such characteristics of particular importance are as follows: the recognition in several forms of
dormant rights, contrary to the fundamental tenet of prior appropriation that continued beneficial use is required to maintain a water
right; the failure to integrate the pumping of tributary groundwater
into priority schedules for surface water; the allowance of overdrafting, both of ground and surface water resources; and the maintenance
of separate state priority schedules for state segments of interstate rivers. Each will be considered briefly below.
41. See note 38 supra.
42. Ferrier, supra note 38, at 840-41.
43. 2 W. HUTCHmNS, WATER RIGHTS LAws IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 519-23
(1974).
44. Generally they store flood waters at times of the year when these are not desired

for direct diversion. Where those with storage rights and those with direct diversion rights are in competition, however, sometimes the former have been
subordinated to the latter regardless of temporal priority. 1 W. HUTCHINS, supra
note 43, at 354-58.
45. In projects operated in accordance with federal reclamation law, for example,
there are restrictions on the delivery of irrigation water to owners with parcels
above a certain size. 43 U.S.C. § 390dd (1982). These restrictions preempt state
law. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
46. On the Kings River, discussed supra note 40, such an agreement was reached in
1927 and users of related waters joined in 1949. This provided "peace on the river
for the first time in more than eighty years." C. KAUPKE, FORTY YEARS ON THE
KINGS RIVER 1917-1957, at 46 (1957).
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Dormant Rights

Dormant or unexercised water rights are an important part of
riparianism, for in principle the riparian landowner is entitled to a
reasonable share of accessible water whether or not he is currently
making use of it.47 Riparianism, however, has been largely
superceded in the West. Many states rejected the doctrine out-of-hand
early in the development of their water rights law,48 while others recognized riparian rights but largely assimilated them into their system
of prior appropriation. 49 Only California among the western states
still permits a riparian landowner to initiate a new use solely on the
basis of landownership,5 0 and this right may be limited where the
51
stream in question is subject to a comprehensive adjudication.
Within riparian jurisdictions that recognize the sharing rule, the
exercise of a previously dormant right-or the expansion of a previously exercised right-in cases of shortage leads in principle to recalculation of each claimant's reasonable share. Temporal priority is
usually not relevant in establishing reasonableness, although some authorities maintain that it is considered. 52 Where claims total or exceed
the available supply, the sharing rule allows all claims to be adjusted
downward to the point where they match that supply. The impact of
activation of the previously dormant claim is thus typically felt by all
users.53
Within prior appropriation jurisdictions, activation of a dormant
right has an entirely different consequence. Since the rule is "no sharing" of shortage, the impact falls entirely on the most junior user or
47. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
48. These are the generally arid states of Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming. 2 W. HUTCHIN S, supra note 43, at 1.
49. These are the states from North Dakota to Texas which span the one-hundredth
meridian and the Pacific Coast states. 2 W. HuTCHINS, supra note 43, at 1-2.
50. In certain circumstances this may also happen in Nebraska. Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738 (1966).
51. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System, 25 Cal. 3d 339, 599 P.2d 656,
158 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1979).
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A(h) (1979).

The Restatement follows

suggestions in Beuscher, Appropriation Water Law Elements in RiparianDoctrine States, 10 BUFFALO L. REV. 448, 451-52 (1961).
53. Post-World War II reported decisions that illustrate this process are rare. One
example is Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955); but see Davis,
supra note 12, at 101 (it is reasonable to consider Harrisv. Brooks a case "where a
subsequent user was able to prevail over a prior user by application of the reasonable-use test," but author suggests "the court did... what it said it was not doing-fixing a minimum level and according the in-place user a preference."). In
recent years, however, "the number of reported court decisions presenting any
riparian issues has dwindled to a few each year." J. SAx & R. ABRAMS, supra note
13, at 183. This decrease is attributed to "the rise in statutory governance of
water use in many states" and "changes in technology [that] have rendered obsolete most uses of water for power" as mill use has disappeared. Id
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users. In California, for example, if a riparian landowner on a fully
appropriated stream begins to use water for irrigation, in principle an
equivalent reduction in use will have to be made by whoever has the

most junior appropriative right.54
Since California is the only western state to retain something simi-

lar to classical riparianism and since riparian rights in that state have
been to some extent stabilized and quantified,55 the problem of the
dormant right's potentially disruptive impact on the fully appropriated western stream may seem a minor one. But dormant rights arise
in other ways. For example, in some states the normal rule that due
diligence is required in putting water to beneficial use is waived for
public entities.56 Municipalities and the state thus can hold unexercised rights for long periods of time, during which others may make
use of the water in question. If and when the public entity exercises
the right, however, one or more junior appropriators may find there is
no longer sufficient water available to satisfy established and previously exercised rights.57
Even more important, the dormant right is often part of the federal
law "reserved" right. This right burst on the western water scene
54. An exception would occur in the highly unlikely event the inception of the riparian right-the date of actual settlement of riparian land with a bona fide intent
to acquire title by patent, Pabst v. Finmand, 190 Cal. 124, 131, 211 P. 11, 14
(1922)--came after the inception of the most junior appropriative right. In that
case the riparian right is junior to the appropriative right, McKinley Bros. v. McCauley, 215 Cal. 229, 231, 9 P.2d 298, 299 (1932); Rindge v. Crags Land Co., 56 Cal.
App. 247, 252, 205 P. 36, 38 (Ct. App. 1922), despite the fact recent dicta state
without qualification that a riparian right is "paramount" to appropriative rights.
In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System, 25 Cal. 3d 339, 347, 599 P.2d
656, 660, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350, 354 (1979); see also Freyfogle, supra note 22, at 487.
55. D. ANDERSON, RIPARIAN WATER RiGHTs IN CALIFORNIA 22-26 (1977) (Staff Paper
No. 4, Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law). Despite
a degree of stability, important questions about the California riparian right continue to arise. Recently, for example, the Court of Appeal overturned a decision
by the State Water Resources Control Board that federal agencies such as the
Forest Service cannot claim riparian rights under state law. In re Determination
of the Rights of the Various Claimants to the Water of Hallett Creek Stream
System in Lassen County, Calif., 187 Cal. App. 3d 863, 866, 232 Cal. Rptr. 208, 210
(Ct. App. 1986) (Forest Service under state law may assert "a defeasible riparian
water right" to water on national forests in excess of that reserved under federal
law, to the extent that such water "has not been appropriated and is available").
56. Often municipalities may acquire and hold rights to water in excess of existing
needs. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-143(B) (Supp. 1985); CAL. WATER CODE
§§ 106.5, 1203, 1462 (West 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 11, § 37-117 (West 1978);
OR. REV. STAT. § 537.190(2) (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-4 (1980); WASH.
REv.CODE ANN. § 90.03.260 (1962). In California, which has an extensive state
water project, see infra text accompanying notes 151-52, the operator of the project is exempt from the due diligence requirement. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10500,
10504 (West 1971 & Supp. 1986).
57. That juniors may use excess municipal water is made explicit, for example, in
CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1203, 1462 (West 1971).
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with the 1908 judicial declaration of the "Winters Doctrine" protective
of Indian claims to adequate water.58 Since World War II the federal
courts have made it plain that the doctrine applies to many other
kinds of federal reservations 59 in order to ensure that the federal pur60
poses for the land reservations are achieved.
Since the reserved right springs from a federal doctrine, in a sense
it is not part of state prior appropriation systems. Yet as a practical
matter, it is necessary for state systems to acknowledge and integrate
the reserved right.61 Federal courts have indicated that the reserved
right takes its place in the state's priority listing as of the date of the
federal land reservation, 6 2 but that present use is not a requirement
for the validity of the right.63 Thus, an important form of dormant
rights exists, and its exercise frequently has the potential to disrupt
established junior uses. 64 In many situations the scope of federal reserved rights is unknown, but if ultimately the quantities permitted
58. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). A hint of what was to come was
provided in United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
59. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963) (national recreation area, national
wildlife refuge, national forest); see Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S.
435 (1955) (hydroelectric site). A current controversy concerns a federal district
court decision that federal reserved water rights exist in wilderness areas designated pursuant to the Wilderness Act. Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842 (D.
Colo. 1985).
60. "[W]hen the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public domain and
reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation." Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976).
61. States have jurisdiction over federal reserved rights whenever the state proceedings are a general adjudication for the determination of water rights. Colorado
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 809 (1976). In
many situations, concurrent water litigation in federal court will be dismissed or
stayed in deference to the state proceedings. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe
of Ariz., 463 U.S. 545, 569 (1983).
62. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976) (right is "in unappropriated
water" and is "superior to the rights of future appropriators.").
63. Id. (right vests "on the date of the reservation" and no use requirement is stated);
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz., 463 U.S. 545, 574 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Unlike state-law claims based on prior appropriation, Indian reserved water rights are not based on actual beneficial use and are not forfeited if
they are not used.").
64. To date this potential is largely unrealized. With regard to reserved rights for
national forests, for example, "officials have refrained from pressing large claims
or assigning them to private enterprises carrying out federal functions. Minimum
flows are located for the most part where they can do the least harm .... "
Trelease, Federal Reserved Water Rights Since PLLRC, 54 DEN. L.J. 473, 492
(1977). With regard to Indian reserved rights, "Winters has mostly functioned to
protect subsistence uses, for survival but not comfort," Collins, The Future
Course of the Winters Doctrine,56 U. COLO. L. REv. 481, 494 (1985), for typically
Indian tribes have not had the financial resources necessary to develop most of
the water to which they are entitled. Shupe, Water in Indian Country: From
Paper Rights to Managed Resource, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 561 (1986).
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are large and are utilized,6 5 the result may be overappropriation of
many western rivers. If the strictures of prior appropriation are followed, this may create severe pressure for relief.
B. Tributary Groundwater
Another cause of contemporary overappropriation has been the
general failure of surface water prior appropriation systems to integrate the pumping of tributary groundwater. 66 Surface water exploitation generally preceded groundwater use in the West, for until
the 1920s existing technology allowed only very limited utilization of
other than artesian groundwater resources. 67 Consequently, throughout the West, rules for groundwater use were developed much later
than those for surface water use. 68 The rules for groundwater, when
developed, often provided rights for the landowner overlying the aquifer,69 in contrast to the widespread refusal to prefer the analogous riparian landowner claimant of surface water.70 In other cases the rules
incorporated the prior appropriation principle, 71 although sometimes
limiting appropriators to surplus waters not needed by overlying
owners.72
These legal developments took place with no particular appreciation of the hydrological interconnection between surface water and
groundwater.73 Just as streams often replenish aquifers, underground
water frequently feeds streams. Thus, in many situations the pumping and consumptive use of groundwater will deprive a stream of
water to the possible detriment of one with a water right on that
stream.
When the groundwater pumper exercises the right of an overlying
landowner, the situation is another example of a dormant right being
65. That the potential for disruption of junior users continues to exist is indicated by
the fact that today numerous Indian tribes are pursuing control over water resources in many ways, such as "financing water development projects, entering
into agreements with federal and state entities, and establishing independent systems for the administration of reservation waters." Shupe, supra note 64, at 562.
66. Trelease, Conjunctive Use of Groundwaterand Surface Water, 27 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 1853 (1982). In recent years Colorado in particular has sought to
remedy this failure. Dunning, supra note 11, at 465-69.
67. THE CALIFORNIA WATER ATLAS 47 (W. Kahrl ed. 1979). The keys to more extensive use of groundwater were development of the deep well turbine pump and
wider distribution of electrical power to agricultural areas. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, BULLETIN 160-83, THE CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN 13 (1983).
68. See Clark, Western Ground-Water Law, 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 407 (R.
Clark ed. 1972).
69. Champion, Ground Water Rights, in 2 W. HUTCHINS, supra note 43, at 634.
70. See supra text accompanying note 48.
71. Champion, supra note 69, at 634.
72. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903).
73. Haase, supra note 6, at 2070.
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exercised in a potentially disruptive fashion. The impact will be felt
first by the most junior appropriator of the surface water. When the
groundwater claimant acts as an appropriator, the situation differs
conceptually in that the right is not a dormant one and in principle the
new appropriator takes subject to existing "downstream" appropriative rights. But given uncertainties as to the precise impact of the
groundwater pumping and use on stream flow and given the general
failure to administer groundwater pumping rights,7 4 the impact may
be precisely the same as in the case of pumping pursuant to the right
of an overlying landowner. It often will be felt first by the most junior
appropriator of the surface water.
C.

Overdrafting

Overdrafting is a phenomenon commonly associated with the
pumping of groundwater. This water is pumped from an aquifer,
which can usefully be thought of as a subterranean reservoir. This
type of reservoir has many advantages when compared to surface reservoirs, the most obvious of which is that it is provided by nature at no
capital cost to the users. In recent years many water specialists have
advocated, often under the rubric of "conjunctive use" of surface and
groundwater, the conscious management of aquifers as reservoirs in
our water supply systems.7 5
Part of the philosophy of conjunctive use management for many is
to limit extractions from aquifers to their "safe yield." Safe yield is,
generally speaking, the amount that can be pumped without unacceptable consequences. 76 These consequences include compaction, leading
to loss of storage capacity and surface subsidence; sea water intrusion
or other water quality degradation brought about by a declining water
table; and escalating pumping costs for obtaining water from ever
greater depths. Overdrafting occurs when extractions exceed the safe
74. See Clark, supra note 68, at 411.
75. E.g., Ambroggi, UndergroundReservoirs to Control the Water Cycle, 236 SC. AM.,
May 1977, at 21. Fully efficient management of surface and groundwater supplies
requires more than merely conjunctive use in the sense of managed aquifer
recharge and use of both the surface water and groundwater in an area. It demands that "both groundwater and surface water.., be controlled by the same
Helweg & Gardner, GroundwaterManagement Problems in Caliagency ....
fornia, in CALIFORNIA WATER PLANNING AND POLICY SELECTED ISSUES 46, 49
(Englebert ed. 1979).
76. See infra note 102. A more restrictive definition of safe yield is "net groundwater
recharge, consisting of recharge from natural precipitation and return flow from
delivered groundwater and delivered imported water, less losses from subsurface
outflow, rising water outflow, evaporation, and infiltration into sewers." A.
SCHNEIDER, GROUNDWATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA 20 n.77 (1977) (Staff Paper No.

2, Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law). This definition is drawn from City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal.3d 199,
278-79, 537 P.2d 1250, 1308, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 59 (1975).
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yield.
Overappropriation of groundwater resources occurs when overdrafting takes place, even though forbidden.78 Commonly the prohibition is declared after safe yield is being regularly exceeded, or in any
event is ineffective in preventing that from taking place. Therefore, it
is necessary in order to achieve the safe yield objective to cut back on
the pumping of groundwater, and if prior appropriation principles are
followed, the impact of the cutback falls on those with the most junior
appropriative rights.
Overdrafting can also occur with surface water resources, although
it is not commonly recognized by that name. Just as "safe yield" represents a judgment as to how much water can be taken from an aquifer without causing unacceptable harm to use of the resources of the
underground reservoir and the water within it, judgments are made as
to how much water can be taken from a stream or lake without causing unacceptable damage. For surface waters, the harm, for example,
may consist of loss of aquatic resources, such as fisheries; salt water
intrusion; or loss of wildlife habitat.79 When legal means are invoked
for limiting extractions to the "safe yield" of the body of surface
water,8 0 the impact falls heavily on the most junior of the surface
water appropriators.
D.

Separate State Schedules

A final example of how contemporary overappropriation occurs is
provided by the exploitation of interstate water resources. A river
shared by two western states, for example, typically is allocated to
users pursuant to priority schedules in each of the states. Where one
state develops more rapidly than the other, the less rapidly developing
state may recognize many priorities junior in time to the most junior
priority in the more rapidly developing state. Yet if the former state
permits those priorities to be exercised, for example in the instance of
77. See infra text accompanying note 131.
78. In some situations overdrafting is approved, usually as part of the "mining" of
aquifers which experience very little recharge. See NATIONAL WATER COMInsSION, WATER PoLIciEs FOR THE FUTuRE 239 (1973). It is a matter of judgment as
to what is illegitimate overappropriation and what is legitimate mining of groundwater, but clearly the latter is appropriate where groundwater is "side tracked
from the hydrologic cycle." Bagley, WaterRights Law and PublicPoliciesRelating to Ground Water "Mining"in the Southwestern States,4 J. LAw & ECON. 144,
147 (1961). It is then, in human time, "not a self-replenishing but an exhaustible
resource similar to petroleum and other minerals." Id.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 153-55.
80. An example of a legal tool for the control of overdrafting of surface waters is the
public trust doctrine. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine
County, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d 709, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983). See generally Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water
Law: Discordor Harmony? 30 ROcKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 17-1 (1984).
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it being upstream from the latter state, overappropriation may occur
with serious impact on the more junior users in the latter state.
This problem is avoided and the likelihood of overappropriation
decreased, of course, if priorities in the two states are integrated and a
mechanism is found to limit total claims to the water supply generally
available. The first, at least, of these two responses has been provided,
at least after the fact, when claimants appear only in their private capacities. 8 ' But when their interests are represented by their states,
who claim some sovereign interest in a portion of the interstate river,
different rules are used.8 2 These have the potential for an interstate
allocation which gives a state insufficient water from the river to satisfy all rights it recognizes, even if these are the most senior rights to
the river.8 3 It then must either cut off the most junior claimants, pursuant to the dictates of the priority rule, or find some other solution to
avoid harm to its juniors.
IV.

CONVENTIONAL STATE RESPONSES TO
OVERAPPROPRIATION

A.

Enforcement of Priorities

The most obvious and straightforward state response to a condition
of overappropriation is to enforce priorities. The plain logic of the priority principle is that in times of water shortage demand is balanced
with supply by denying any water to the most junior of the appropriators. The concept is simple and well known to western water users.
Enforcement of priorities assumes, of course, that the agency or
court engaged in enforcement can determine the quantum of each
claimant's right as well as its priority. This means actual beneficial
use, as opposed to the paper right, must be established; rights must be
adjusted for any forfeiture; and in jurisdictions which recognize prescription of water rights, account must be taken of the modification of
priorities through prolonged wrongful use. These are often difficult
tasks, but they are frequently done with general success in the west84
ern states.
81. Bean v. Morris, 221 U.S. 485 (1911).
82. See generally Tarlock, supra note 1.
83.
Whether the apportionment of the water of an interstate stream be
made by compact between the upper and lower States with the consent
of Congress or by a decree of this Court, the apportionment is binding
upon the citizens of each State and all water claimants, even where the
State had granted the water rights before it entered into the compact.
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
84. Agencies are assisted in this regard, at least in California, by "a high level of
voluntary cooperation in ... information gathering from most water rights holders." Comment, Administrative Water Rights Inspections in California,12 U.C.

DAVIs L. REV. 105, 106 (1979).
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In the process of the enforcement of priorities, means are available
within the prior appropriation system itself to deal with the disruptive
consequences of denying water to established junior users. One means
is to redefine what qualifies as reasonable beneficial use of water or as
a reasonable means to divert and convey water to the place of beneficial use, so that senior users must either improve their operational efficiency or be partially or fully denied their water right.85 This
solution may protect juniors, but at some cost and possibly severe disruption for seniors. In its simplest form it is merely an application of
the conventional notion that appropriators may not waste water, but if
carried beyond situations of egregious inefficiency it amounts to a
change in the fundamental norm of temporal priority.
Other means of adjustment are the "physical solution," by which
86
juniors bear the burden of some change in the operations of seniors,
and the negotiation of a settlement by water users. Although such a
settlement may depart from previously established priorities, it can be
viewed as a reordering of priorities based on consent of the water
users.
B. Augmentation of the Supply
The enforcement of priorities and denial of any water to the most
junior appropriators is a disruptive act, one which water authorities
will typically seek to avoid. One means of avoidance is to augment the
water supply in the source, in order to ensure that except in extraordinary drought conditions there will be adequate water for all claimants.
What might be termed the "supply-side management" aspect of water
resources has in fact been the common solution for western water
problems, as opposed to the demand-side management represented by
the enforcement of priorities.
The results of this approach to water management can be seen all
over the West. 87 Dams, reservoirs and aqueducts form an astounding
network of facilities to ensure adequate water supplies for growing
cities and for extensive acreages of irrigated agriculture. These works
are a tribute to the bold imagination, engineering skill and political
and legal finesse of generations of persons devoted to water resources
development.
There has been, however, a dark side to the proliferation of western water projects. Many were designed and constructed with flagrant disregard of their environmental consequences, for example the
destruction of fish resources. 88 Others, in being faithful to the tenet of
85. Dunning, supra note 11, at 448-58.
86. Id. at 448.
87. See generally D. WORsTER, supra note 7; THE CALIFORNIA WATER ATLAs, supra
note 67; E. COOPER, AQUEDUcT EMPIRE 88 (1968).
88. J. BAIN, R. CAvEs & J. MARGOLIS, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA's WATER INDUSTRY 511
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appropriation law that water may be moved to any place of need, so
completely ignored the interests of inhabitants of an area of origin
89
that they provided the basis for generations of regional conflict. Still
others were possible only because of enormous subsidies, which meant
the direct beneficiaries paid only a small part of the cost and others in
the country were called upon to bear the major financial burden.90
The consequence of these unfortunate aspects of western water resources development, combined with the simple fact that by now most
of the best dam sites have already been developed, 91 is that a new climate has emerged regarding water projects. 92 New starts for major
water projects are today rare. 93 The massive interbasin transfer
projects under active discussion twenty years ago are on the back
burner, 94 if not forgotten altogether. The focus of attention is reallocation of the existing developed water supplies, and increased "water
95
marketing" is for many a favorite means to achieve that reallocation.
The essence of water marketing is the transfer, usually in exchange for dollars, of water from a lower-valued use to a higher-valued use. 96 Typically this transfer is thought of as being from
(1966) ("no evidence" that the Bureau of Reclamation considered the fishery benefits lost when it constructed and operated Friant Dam to stop all releases of
water downstream into the San Joaquin River).
89. See W. KAHRL, WATER AND POWER (1982) (export of water from the Owens Valley by the City of Los Angeles).
90. See P. LEVEEN & L. KING, TURNING OFF THE TAP ON FEDERAL WATER SUBSIDIES

(1985).
91. Stetson, Opportunitiesfor Improving the Ways We Use Water 1, in UNIV. OF
COLO. SCHOOL OF LAW NATURAL RESOURCES LAW CENTER, WESTERN WATER:
EXPANDING USES/FINITE SUPPLIES (1986).

92. Stetson, an experienced consulting civil engineer with a regional perspective on
western water resources development, notes that in "today's atmosphere of high
costs, protection of the environment and lowered expectations, additional water
development projects will face great difficulties." Id at 4. See generally R. SMITH,
TROUBLED WATERS: FINANCING WATER IN THE WEST (1984).
93. Getches, Competing Demands for the Colorado River, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 413,
450 (1985) (no new construction on federal water projects in the Colorado River
Basin in almost ten years).
94. The most grandiose of these, developed in 1964 by the Ralph M. Parsons Company, was the North American Water and Power Alliance (NAWAPA), which
would have taken water from the rivers of the Yukon to supplement water supplies in Canada, Mexico and the United States from the Great Lakes to California. THE CALIFORNIA WATER ATLAS, supra note 67, at 107. The estimated cost
was $200 billion. Id.
95. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, supra
note 40, at 72; NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 78, at 270. The number

of legislative studies, conferences and meetings devoted to water marketing has
increased markedly in the past several years.
96. See generally T. ANDERSON, WATER CRISIS: ENDING THE POLICY DROUGHT (1983);
Oeltjen & Fischer, Allocation of Rights to Water: Preferences,Priorities,and the
Role of the Market, 57 NEB. L. REV. 245 (1978); C. LEE, THE TRANSFER OF WATER

RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA (1977) (Staff Paper No. 5, Governor's Commission to Re-
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agricultural uses to municipal and industrial uses, but water marketing can also take place entirely within the agricultural sector. Water
markets do not augment water supplies, but by directing water to
higher-valued uses they increase overall economic efficiency. And
although those who do the water selling obviously have less water
available after the sale, they often can maintain their productivity by
investment of the sale proceeds in better water management. A
farmer, for example, might sell the rights to half his water supply but
invest all or part of the proceeds in equipment and management services that will allow the remaining half of his previous water supply to
sustain his previous level of production.
Although water marketing has considerable appeal, it also presents
many problems. 97 Adverse impacts on third parties, institutional barriers and social constraints may explain why despite a considerable
period of discussion and advocacy increased water marketing has not
been widely observed in the West. Thus, with dismal prospects for
water supply augmentation and with markets slow to develop, states
with overappropriation situations must return to confront the unpleasantness of enforcing priorities. One way to escape this result is
simply to abandon the no-sharing rule of prior appropriation and to
find a way to spread the consequences of water shortage over all users
of the source. Various ways to replace the no-sharing rule of prior
appropriation with a sharing rule can be regarded as "equitable
apportionment."
V. EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT CASES IN CALIFORNIA:
AN UNCONVENTIONAL STATE RESPONSE TO
OVERAPPROPRIATION
State equitable apportionment of western water resources appears
in the reported appellate decisions for the western states infrequently,
and generally in conjunction with some other doctrine or principle offered as a basis for the departure from priority. The courts perhaps
are uncomfortable with the idea of simply abandoning the established
priority principle because of disruptive or counterproductive impact,
particularly in an area of property law where "taking" claims might be
raised were an established rule not to be followed. 98 But typically
view California Water Rights Law); L. HARTMAN & D. SEASTONE, WATER TRANsFERS: ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF ALTERNATIVE INsTITUTIONs(1970).

97. See generally Dunning, Reflections on the Transfer of Water Rights, 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 109 (1977).
98. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468, 1474 (9th Cir. 1985), cert granted,judgment
vacated & case remanded,106 S. Ct. 3269 (1986) (in light of federal constitutional
provisions, circuit court held substantial modification by Hawaii state court of
state water law doctrine cannot divest water rights established pursuant to the
earlier doctrine without payment of just compensation).
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adoption of the other doctrine or invocation of the other principle is
justified explicitly or implicitly as necessary to produce an equitable
result, and this usually means a sharing of water shortages rather than
following the no-sharing rule of prior appropriation.
A.

Pasadena v. Alhambra

One good example of the process just described is City of Pasadena
v. City ofAlhambra,99 a California decision on groundwater allocation.
In Pasadena, cities, private parties and a water company pumped
water from the Raymond Basin in the San Gabriel Valley. Beginning
with the water year 1913-14, in most years extractions exceeded the
safe yield of the basin, as that safe yield was later defined. This led to
a gradual decline in the basin's water table between 1914 and 1937,100
when a complaint was filed by the City of Pasadena. The city sought
an injunction against continued overdraft and a declaration of the
rights of the pumpers.
Pursuant to existing statutory authority and well-established practice, the trial court in Pasadenareferred the matter to an administrative agency for an investigation and report on the physical facts. It
was this report, filed in 1943, that indicated that 1913-14 was the beginning of the overdraft period.
Long before Pasadena,the priorities among groundwater pumpers
had been established by the California Supreme Court.01 Pumping by
overlying owners for use on their own lands has first priority, with
such pumpers to share in riparian fashion the available supply. Other
use is appropriative, and, to the extent there is water surplus to the
needs of the overlyers, appropriators may use it in accordance with the
conventional rule of priority. It was also settled that extractions
should not exceed the safe yield.102

The larger pumpers from the Raymond Basin were appropriators, 103 so in view of the existing rules it was to be expected that the
trial court would simply order the most junior pumpers to cease their
use of groundwater to the extent necessary to balance pumping with
safe yield. This solution, however, would have placed a financial burden on the City of Pasadena,1 0 4 which at that time was not yet taking
99. 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949).
100. In a representative well field the water table fell anywhere from 27 to 81 feet
between 1920 and 1937. Id. at 930, 207 P.2d at 31.
101. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903).
102. City of San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 186 Cal. 7, 16, 198 P. 784, 788 (1921)
(groundwater should not be taken "in such quantities or in such a manner as to
destroy or endanger the source of supply"); Burr v. Maclay Rancho Water Co.,
154 Cal. 428, 438, 98 P. 260, 264 (1908).
103. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 927, 207 P.2d 17, 29 (1949).
104. Pasadena was the "chief producer" of water from the Raymond Basin. Id- at 916,
207 P.2d at 22. It should also be noted that all the major pumpers in the basin
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the more expensive imported water available from the Colorado
River.1 05 In these circumstances, the trial court devised an alternate
way to reduce pumping to the safe yield,106 one which the Supreme
Court approved. This is known as "mutual prescription," and it results in a sharing of shortage diametrically opposed to the lack of sharing found when priorities are enforced.
The premise of the mutual prescription theory was that once the
period of overdraft began in 1913-14, additional pumping was wrongful
and gave earlier pumpers a cause of action for injunctive relief in order to prevent long-term depletion of the water in the basin. 07 This
cause of action was subject to a statute of limitations, so-it was reasoned-if the statute ran without the filing of an action, those wrongfully pumping would acquire prescriptive rights in the groundwater
08
supply.
The difficult part of this theory is that ordinarily courts in prescription cases require that the party acquiring a property right act
adversely to the party losing the property right and that the latter
have actual or constructive notice of this adverse activity. Thus, for
example, a downstream diverter making reasonable use of water
would be subject to prescription when a junior upstream dries up the
stream for the requisite time period before it reaches the downstream
senior's point of diversion.109 In Pasadena,however, all pumpers from
the Raymond Basin had from 1913 through 1937 obtained all the
groundwater they wished.130 How then could it be said the later
pumpers acted adversely to the interests of the earlier pumpers?
The majority in Pasadenaacknowledged that all pumpers received
their full complement of water, but they argued later pumping was

105.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

except for one public utility company stipulated to the judgment. Id. at 916, 207
P.2d at 23.
1&Lat 934, 207 P.2d at 23. Colorado River water was first brought to Southern
California's coastal areas in 1941. THE CALIFORNIA WATER ATLAS, supra note 67,
at 42. The importer was the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California
(MWD), which was formed in 1928. ACWA'S 75-YEAR HIsTORY 1910-1985 132 (M.
Mohr ed. 1985). Although Pasadena was a charter member of MIWD, id., like
many other water users in the area it preferred to use the less expensive groundwater as long as possible. E. COOPER, supra note 87, at 88. From 1941 to 1951,
during which period Pasadenawas decided, MWD delivered through its Colorado
River Aqueduct less than 22% of the water available to it. Id. at 89. The failure of
Southern California water users to take all available Colorado River water during
that time, a decision which Pasadena arguably facilitated, contributed significantly to groundwater overdrafts which by the 1960's became very serious. Id. at
89-90.
City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 922, 207 P.2d 17, 26 (1949).
rd at 929, 207 P.2d at 30.
Id at 932, 207 P.2d at 32.
Craig, PrescriptiveWater Rights in Californiaand the Necessityfor a Valid Statutory Appropriation,42 CALiF. L. REV. 219, 224 (1954).
City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 931, 207 P.2d 17, 32 (1949).
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adverse to earlier pumping because it triggered overdraft which was
evidenced by the declining water table.111 The overdraft itself was adverse to the long-term interest of the earlier pumpers, because it could
lead ultimately to destruction of the supply. And notice was provided
2
by the decline in water levels in the wells.1

This expansive understanding of prescription in the groundwater
context brought a strong protest from the lone dissenter in Pasadena.
He argued that to charge the earlier pumpers with knowledge of overdraft because of falling water levels in their wells was "absurd,"113 as
many factors could produce a lowering water table. The duration and
intensity of the seasonal rains and the level of humidity, said to impact
on evaporation levels, were mentioned as important variables relevant
to the level of the water table.1 4 His concerns were appropriate, and
they were reflected in more stringent notice requirements for groundwater prescription announced in a later decision of the California
Supreme Court.115

The adoption of a dubious theory of prescription in Pasadena did
not ensure a sharing rather than a no-sharing rule in the resolution of
the pumpers' dispute. Prescription can serve to reorder priorities,
6
placing the wrong-doing acquirer ahead of others who are ousted,"1
but in principle the reordered priorities should be enforced in the
usual manner. To ensure sharing of the shortage, the Pasadenacourt
had to take another step-to find that "mutual" prescription had occurred. In this the court broke new ground.
Ordinarily where prescription occurs there is a winner and a
loser-a wrongdoer who has not been sued within the limitation period acquires a property right, while the previous holder of the right
who failed to sue within the appropriate period loses a property right.
In Pasadena,however, it will be recalled that all pumpers continued
to draw water from the common resource, 117 so that the earlier pumpers-analogous to the "true owner" in a real property adverse possession case-were injured only insofar as ultimate depletion of the
aquifer was threatened. This unusual twist to the prescription aspect
of the case allowed the court to conceive of the continued activity by
the earlier pumpers as "self help" by which they to an extent "re111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

I& at 929, 207 P.2d at 30.
Id., 207 P.2d at 31.
Id- at 946, 207 P.2d at 40.
Id
City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 283, 537 P.2d 1250,
1311, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1,62 (1975) ("notice of adversity in fact caused by the actual
commencement of overdraft" now required). The determination that overdraft
has commenced no longer can be deduced merely from falling water levels in
wells, see infra note 131.
116. Craig, supra note 109, at 224.
117. See supra text accompanying note 110.
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tained or acquired" water rights.1' 8 The phrase "mutual prescription"
suggests it was acquisition rather than retention-that the earlier
pumpers, having lost rights to later pumpers, to an extent recovered
them through their continued pumping.
All this may seem both exceedingly conceptual and open to criticism on conceptual grounds. The absence of immediate adversity
makes the prescription aspect questionable; and if one accepts the prescription argument of the majority, then it would follow that the court
should have determined the precise extent of the prescriptive (or
"counter-prescriptive") acquisition. Instead, as noted by the dissent,
the "scattered operations" conducted by the later pumpers were simply "lumped together to constitute one prescriptive right."19

The result of the dubious logic of the Pasadenacourt, however, was
a sharing of shortage rule which greatly benefited the City of
Pasadena as a junior appropriator. All pumpers were treated as being
on an equal footing, and each was cut back to about two-thirds of previous pumping in order to bring extractions in line with the safe
yield.12 0 A formula was developed which proved useful in a number of
subsequent Southern California groundwater adjudications.123 The
results in these cases fairly can be seen as an equitable alternative to
application of the priority principle.
Although the Pasadenacourt's comments on the equitable nature
of its solution are brief, they are very much on point. The court noted
that application of the priority principle would result in "an unequal
118. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 931-32, 207 P.2d 17, 32 (1949).
119. Id.at 949, 207 P.2d at 42.
120. Id at 923, 207 P.2d at 27. In 1955 the trial court, pursuant to its continuing jurisdiction, increased this amount. Krieger & Banks, Ground Water Basin Management, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 56, 61 (1962).
121. The formula, developed by the trial court and approved by the Supreme Court,
permitted continued pumping of
the highest continuous production of water for beneficial use in any five
(5) year period prior to the filing of the complaint by each of the parties
in each of said units, as to which there has been no cessation of use by it
during any subsequent continuous five (5) year period.
City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 922, 207 P.2d 17, 26 (1949).
The later adjudications, most of which were settled by stipulated judgment, are
discussed in A. SCHNEIDE, supranote 76, at 22-29. One adjudication in which the
terms of a stipulated judgment based on the Pasadenaformula were enforced on
non-stipulating parties is California Water Service Co. v. Sidebotham & Son, Inc.,
224 Cal. App. 2d 715, 37 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Ct. App. 1964). The court there referred to
an argument by a non-stipulating party as "an ingenious attempt to revive the
theory of allocating water rights on the basis of priority in time which the
Supreme Court expressly rejected in City of Pasadenav. City of Alhambra ....
"
Id. at 728, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 8. A commentator writing during the heyday of
Pasadenanoted that one reason for adherence to its formula was "the apparent
acceptance of the equities embodied therein by a vast majority of ground water
pumpers." Reis, Legal Planningfor Ground Water Production, 38 S. CAL. L.
REV. 484, 488 (1965).
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sharing of the burden of curtailing the overdraft" and that this would
be unjustified "where all of the parties have been producing water
from the underground basin for many years, and none of them have
acted to protect the supply or prevent invasion of their rights until this
proceeding was instituted." 122 The court also commented that the solution adopted "will promote the best interest of the public, because a
pro tanto reduction of the amount of water devoted to each present
use would normally be less disruptive than total elimination of some
of the uses." 123 The same, obviously, could be said of many cases
where the priority principle is enforced.
Significantly, the equitable apportionment aspects of Pasadena
have proved to be more durable than the mutual prescription doctrine
itself. The doctrine, by focusing on past pumping and rewarding
pumpers on the basis of their highest pumping levels, arguably provoked a "race to the pumphouse" by those with an interest in groundwater production. 124 Despite the apparent utility of the mutual
prescription formula,125 some post-Pasadena judicial opinions have
been implicitly or explicitly critical of its rigidity.
One such decision implicitly evidencing more interest in an equitable solution than in application of the mutual prescription formula itself is Techachapi-Cummings.126 There the California Court of
Appeal read Pasadena as limiting mutual prescription to situations
where overdraft results from excessive pumping by appropriators,
thus excluding those where it comes from excessive pumping by overlyers. 127 It consequently followed earlier cases which under the rubric
of "correlative" rights require a riparian-like sharing by overlyers.
The most important of the post-Pasadena opinions is City of Los
2
s a massive California Supreme
Angeles v. City of San Fernando,1
resources in the San
of
groundwater
allocation
Court decision on the
Fernando Valley. San Fernandogreatly undermines the utility of mu122. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 932-33, 207 P.2d 17, 32 (1949).
123. Id at 933, 207 P.2d at 32.
124. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 267, 537 P.2d 1250,
1299, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 50 (1975). Efforts to halt this race legislatively, CAL. WATER
CODE §§ 1005.1-1005.2 (West 1984), were in some cases apparently unsuccessful.
Krieger & Banks, supra note 120, at 62.
125. A. SCHNEIDER, supra note 76, at 23. In these cases, as in Pasadena,Krieger &
Banks, supra note 120, at 61, the availability of supplemental imported surface
water was a crucial element in the solution.
126. Tehachapi-Cummings County Water Dist. v. Armstrong, 49 Cal. App. 3d 992, 122
Cal. Rptr. 918 (Ct. App. 1975).
127. "Without appropriation [of non-surplus waters] ...there is no paramount right
which can be prescribed against." Id at 1001, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 924. This runs
counter to the usual notion for surface waters that one riparian may prescribe
against another riparian where the former takes for riparian use more than his
reasonable share of the stream. D. ANDERSON, supra note 55, at 83.
128. 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975).
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tual prescription by holding that there can be no prescription against
municipal pumpers,129 which in most cases effectively destroys the
doctrine's even-handed impact on pumping from an overdrafted basin.130 The opinion also refines and limits the operation of mutual
prescription with regard to private pumpers.'31
San Fernando'smost interesting observations, however, concern
the relationship between mutual prescription and equitable apportionment. Chief Justice Wright comments that although in Pasadenamutual prescription allowed "a fair result on the facts there
presented,"132 allocation "mechanically" based on the mutual prescription formula "does not necessarily result in the most equitable
apportionment of water according to need." 33 Many more factors, he
says, must often be taken into account in order to achieve "a true equitable apportionment." 34 The implication is that a court should select
for use those rules that produce an equitable result in the circumstances, whether they be the sharing rules of mutual prescription, the
explicitly discretionary approach the federal courts use in interstate
water controversies or the rules used in San Fernando. 35
San Fernandoitself was decided in a way greatly favoring the City
of Los Angeles over competing cities in the San Fernando Valley. Los
Angeles was awarded most of the valley's native groundwater on the
129. Id at 274,537 P.2d at 1304-05,123 Cal. Rptr. at 55-56. This decision was based upon
a 1935 statutory provision not relevant in Pasadena,where all municipal pumpers
stipulated to the judgment and the non-stipulating party was a public utility company not covered by the statute.
130. A. SCHNEiDER, supra note 76, at 31-32.
131. Id. at 32-34. One refinement provides extractions cannot exceed safe yield plus
"temporary surplus." City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199,
280, 537 P.2d 1250, 1309, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 60 (1975). Temporary surplus is "the
amount of water which if withdrawn would create the storage space [in the aquifer] necessary to avoid... waste." Id. "Waste" could come from outflow to the
ocean, evaporation and sewer infiltration. Id. at 304, 537 P.2d at 1327, 123 Cal.
Rptr. at 78.
132. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 266, 537 P.2d 1250,
1298, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 49 (1975).
133. Id. at 265, 537 P.2d at 1298, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
134. Id
135. Interestingly, in implying the ultimate judicial goal for California courts is an
equitable apportionment, Chief Justice Wright cited a federal common law interstate allocation case, Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945). The latter states
that equitable apportionment requires "the exercise of an informed judgment on
a consideration of many factors," id, at 618, although-at least in controversies
between appropriation states-priority is "the guiding principle." Id. In interstate equitable apportionment cases there is, of course, an element of state sovereignty not present in a state equitable apportionment case, Colorado v. New
Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984), although that element seems to work more to
protect established uses against disruption than to ensure an egalitarian sharing
among the competing sovereigns. Id.; see also Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46
(1907).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:76

basis of its long-standing senior pueblo water right, 3 6 and it received
most of the non-native groundwater on the basis of a right to recapture the surface water it imported which ultimately reached the
groundwater basin. 3 7 There thus was little sharing of the available
supply, and, despite the implication of the court's discussion of
Pasadena, no "equitable apportionment of water according to
need."138 The question is presented, how can this result be reconciled
with the approval given the sharing approach of equitable
apportionment?
San Fernando, unfortunately, does not provide a satisfactory answer to that question. The main groundwater basin in question was in
overdraft from 1941-42,139 and the impact of enforcement of Los Angeles' priorities was a disruption of established junior uses.140 The situation therefore seems similar to that in Pasadena,where "restriction to
safe yield on a strict priority basis might have deprived parties who
had been using substantial quantities of ground water for many years
of all further access to such water."'14 1 But San Fernando notes that
juniors in its case were engaged in substantial pumping prior to the
commencement of overdraft, 142 and it concludes from that that mutual prescription was "not needed" for the Pasadenapurpose: "avoiding complete elimination of appropriative rights stemming from uses
of recent years in favor of those based on earlier uses."'143 Instead, it
says, by imposing mutual prescription the effect of the trial court's
judgment was "to eliminate [the priorities of Los Angeles] based not
on the timing of its appropriations but on its importation of Owens
water and on its pueblo right."'44 Why the nature of the priority136. A pueblo water right, derived from the Mexican law, is the paramount right of a
city as successor of a pueblo to use water naturally occurring within the city's
limits for the reasonable needs of the city and its inhabitants. City of Los Angeles
v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 217, 537 P.2d 1250, 1265, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1,
16 (1975). These needs may be within the original territory of the pueblo or
within areas added by annexation. Id. at 252-53 n.43, 537 P.2d at 1289 n.43, 123
Cal. Rptr. at 40 n.43.
137. Id. at 262, 537 P.2d at 1296, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 47. The right is based upon the desire
"to credit the importer with the fruits of his expenditures and endeavors in bringing into the basin water that would not otherwise be there." Id at 261, 537 P.2d at
1295, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
138. Id. at 265, 537 P.2d at 1298, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
139. Id. at 221, 537 P.2d at 1268, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 19. This finding of the trial court,
although disputed by the Court of Appeal, City of Los Angeles v. City of San
Fernando, 105 Cal. Rptr. 77, 86 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972), was not overturned by the
Supreme Court of California.
140. See City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 220, 537 P.2d 1250,
1267, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 18 (1975).
141. Id. at 266, 537 P.2d at 1299, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 50 (commenting on Pasadena).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 267, 537 P.2d at 1299, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
144. Id.
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recapture right and pueblo right rather than earlier appropriation-is
relevant if the objective is to protect long-time junior users from disruption is unexplained.
I conclude from this that the impact of San Fernando on
Pasadena's equitable apportionment language is indeterminate. The
Pasadenaresult was approved in San Fernando,but the logical implications for San Fernandoitself were not pursued. Nothing in the special circumstances of San Fernando, which involve the rare pueblo
right and the recapture right, would seem to preclude another court
adopting Pasadena's equitable apportionment approach in the more
usual context of priority based on early appropriation.
B. California's Delta Water Cases
Overdrafting of groundwater was the root of the problem in both
Pasadena and San Fernando, but the functional equivalent of overdrafting can also occur for surface water resources. When detrimental
resource impacts indicate that too much water is being or may be
taken from a river or lake,145 diversions of surface water may have to
be limited to the safe yield. California's Sacramento-San Joaquin
Delta is a good example of one location where this process has been
implemented and also where a sharing rule has been imposed on
diverters.
The most important agricultural area in California is the Central
Valley, which is drained in the north by the Sacramento River and in
the south by the San Joaquin River.146 The confluence of these two
rivers is located in a large, lowland delta southwest of the City of Sacramento.47 From this delta water flows westerly through Suisun Bay
and San Francisco Bay to join the Pacific Ocean at the Golden Gate.148
Both the Sacramento and the San Joaquin Rivers and most of their
tributaries have been subjected to extensive development.149 Local
agencies use much of the flow,150 and major state and federal projects
145. See supra text accompanying note 79.
146. See generally THE CALIFORNIA WATER ATLAS, supra note 67, at 46-47.
147. The legal boundaries of the Delta are set forth in CAL WATER CODE § 12220
(West 1971).
148. Id. A good recent overview of this estuary is provided in Nichols, Cloern, Luoma
& Peterson, The Modificationof an Estuary,231 ScIENCE 567 (1986). With regard
to diversity of change, San Francisco Bay today is deemed "the major estuary in
the United States most modified by human activity." Id.
149. See generally D. PIsANI, supra note 39.
150. Some of these are municipalities, but most are water districts of one kind or another. In California, there are said to be "more than 3,700 public and private
agencies with administrative authority over some aspect of water supply, delivery, use, and treatment." THE CALIFORNIA WATER ATLAS, supra note 67, at 63.
Brief histories of more than three hundred local agencies with a major water
supply function can be found in ACWA'S 75-YEAR HISTORY, supra note 105.
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use a great deal more.1 51 Water is diverted not only for use throughout
the Central Valley, but also for use in the San Francisco Bay Area and
2
in Southern California.5
One result of the many water projects is an enormous reduction in
the amount of fresh water which reaches the Delta and the estuary
downstream.153 Reduced fresh water outflow through the Delta permits increased salt water intrusion, 5 4 which threatens water users in
the Delta and those who export from the Delta. 55 Suggestions for a
56
physical barrier to control sea water intrusion have been rejected.
Instead, a policy of salinity control through maintenance of a fresh
water hydraulic barrier has been adopted.57
A twofold mechanism is used to establish the hydraulic barrier.
First, ambient salinity standards are set through a water quality control planning process managed by California's State Water Resources
Control Board (SWRCB).s58 Second, implementation of these ambient standards is achieved by the imposition of terms and conditions on
the appropriative water rights held by some of those whose diversions
impact on Delta outflow. 159 To date such terms and conditions have
151. THE CALIFORNIA WATER ATLAS, supra note 67, at 47-56. Central Valley facilities
constitute "the world's largest man-made water system." Nichols, Cloern, Luoma
& Peterson, supra note 148, at 569.
152. THE CALIFORNIA WATER ATLAs, supra note 67, at 53.
153. Currently the average flow into San Francisco Bay is estimated at less than 40%
of average historic (1850) levels. Nichols, Cloern, Luoma & Peterson, supra note
148, at 569. It is anticipated by the year 2000 the figure will be 30%. Id
154. United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 108, 227
Cal. Rptr. 161, 172 (Ct. App. 1986).
155. Id. In addition, biological communities, particularly migratory fish, are damaged.
As the "null zone"-the point where downstream-flowing river currents are balanced by upstream-flowing bottom currents carrying salt water-moves upstream, the pelagic food web is suppressed and biological productivity decreases.
Findings from recent scientific studies "illustrate the sensitivity of northern San
Francisco Bay biological communities to persistent low river flow and suggest
that further reductions in freshwater inflow. . . could permanently alter the pelagic food web and fisheries yield there." Nichols, Cloern, Luoma & Peterson,
supra note 148, at 569.
156. E. COOPER, supra note 87, at 266-67.
157. United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 108, 227
Cal. Rptr. 161, 172 (Ct. App. 1986).
158. This process was begun in the mid-1960s, id at 110, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 174, and it
proceeds pursuant to federal as well as state mandates. Id. at 108-09, 227 Cal.
Rptr. at 173.
159. In 1978 the SWRCB engaged in a single set of proceedings, which led to promulgation of a Water Quality Control Plan for the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta
and Suisun Marsh and of Water Right Decision 1485 (D 1485). In re Permit 12720
(Application 5625) and Other Permits of United States Bureau of Reclamation for
the Federal Central Valley Project and of California Department of Water Resources for the State Water Project, California State Water Resources Control
Board, Decision 1485 (August 1978). In litigation challenging both the plan and
the decision, the California Court of Appeal recently observed that it was "un-
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only been imposed on the federal government's Central Valley Project
(CVP) and on California's State Water Project (SWP).160

The CVP consists of many different units, but most of them predate the SWP, as do their applications for appropriative water
rights.'16 Thus one might expect that the burden of meeting delta salinity standards would fall largely upon the SWP. Put another way,
one might anticipate that as the generally more junior appropriator,
the SWP more than the CVP would find the amount of unappropriated water available for it limited by the need for fresh water for salinity control.
In fact, however, the policy of the SWRCB has been to impose the
burden of salinity control on the CVP and the SWP without regard to
priority of appropriation, 62 and today there exists a possibility that
this policy will be extended to other diverters who impact on salinity
levels in the Delta.163 The way in which this is done can usefully be
regarded as a second example of state equitable apportionment of

160.

161.
162.
163.

wise" for the SWRCB to combine the water quality and water rights functions in
a single proceeding, id- at 119, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 180, for in so doing it "compromised its important water quality role by defining its scope too narrowly in terms
of enforceable water rights." Id The court emphasized that in order adequately
to discharge its water quality planning obligation to protect beneficial uses, the
SVRCB must consider, in addition to conditioning water rights, "other actions...
such as remedial actions to curtail excess diversions." Id at 120, 227 Cal. Rptr. at
181. It also stated that in the exercise of its reserved jurisdiction to modify the
terms and conditions of permits, the SWRCB could require appropriators to provide a reasonable level of protection for water quality, even if that means enhancement of water quality beyond what would have existed had there been no
appropriation. I- at 142, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 195. Protection is provided either
through ceasing diversion or releasing stored water, since for the control of salinity intrusion the otherwise-discredited notion that "the solution to pollution is
dilution" still governs.
Pursuant to the public trust doctrine the SWRCB could impose similar terms and
conditions on other permittees whose diversions are harmful to nonconsumptive,
instream uses of navigable waters, i& at 149-50, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 201-02, and it is
likely the agency or a court could do so for riparians and for early appropriators
of whom no permit is required. Such authority also exists on the basis of reasonableness provisions where the harm is to consumptive uses of water, i& at 129-30,
227 Cal. Rptr. at 187-88, see inkfra text accompanying note 180, although it may be
limited to redressing harm caused by the diversion itself and thus may not allow
enhancement. Id
I- at 131 n.25, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 188 n.25.
Id at 131, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
The provisions of both the water quality control plan and D 1485 will be reconsidered in a hearing the SWRCB has scheduled to begin in mid-1987. In addition to
possibly exercising its authority with regard to diverters other than the CVP and
the SWP, see supra note 160, the SWRCB may increase the scope of protection by
setting salinity standards for San Francisco Bay. Currently various studies are
underway to determine the impacts of decreased fresh water inflow into San
Francisco Bay. 1984 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY ECOLOGICAL STUDIES

PROGRAM FOR THE SACRAMENTO - SAN JOAQUIN ESTUARY 93-109 (R. Brown ed.
1986).
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water resources. As in Pasadena,the consequences of a shortage of
water are shared by the major users, instead of being allocated in accordance with the priority principle.
Both the CVP and SWP hold appropriative rights on the basis of
state permits. These are required, at least against the state, for any
recently initiated nonriparian use of surface water in California. 164
Permittees take with a priority date fixed by the moment the permit
application is filed, unless the SWRCB provides otherwise.
The mechanism by which the SWRCB undoes the usual rule on
priority is simple: It, as the creator of the appropriative right, defines
it in a way which eliminates priority. In the best known early example of this, the SWRCB's predecessor conditioned a permit to appropriate water for power purposes so that it would not "interfere with
future appropriations of said water for agricultural or municipal purposes." 165 The agency thus provided itself with the power to grant
later applications to appropriate for the designated purposes and to
allow the applicants to have a better priority than the power permittee. First-in-time, first-in-right was effectively replaced by a system of
administrative discretion,166 which today is known as "reserved
67
jurisdiction."
If the SWRCB can condition permits so as to reverse the usual priorities, it can as easily do so to eliminate priority of any sort and put
claimants on an equal footing. This is what it did with regard to appro164. People v. Shirokow, 26 Cal. 3d 301, 308-09, 605 P.2d 859, 865, 162 Cal. Rptr. 30,35
(1980). Possibly such a use can be maintained against private parties on the basis
of prescription. Id. at 312 n.15, 605 P.2d 859, 867 n.15, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 38 n.15.
165. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. Department of Pub. Works, 1 Cal. 2d 476,477, 35 P.2d
1027, 1027 (1934).
166. In this case the agency acted pursuant to explicit statutory provisions that prefer
some uses over others. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 106, 1254 (West 1971); see generally
Trelease, Preferenceto the Use of Water, 27 ROcKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 133 (1955).
Such provisions, if honored more extensively throughout the West, would complicate greatly the administration of water rights. In California the SWRCB is given
great discretion in its award and conditioning of water rights by language directing it to act in "the public interest," CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1253, 1255, 1257
(West 1971), and it has been said this language is "the primary statutory standard." Johnson Rancho County Water Dist. v. State Water Rights Bd., 235 Cal.
App. 2d 863, 874, 45 Cal. Rptr. 589, 596 (Ct. App. 1965); see also United States v.
State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 103, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161,
169 (Ct. App. 1986) (noting as well in exercising its permit power the SWRCB's
"first concern is recognition and protection of prior rights to beneficial use of the
water ....); Bank of America v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 42 Cal. App.
3d 198, 212, 116 Cal. Rptr. 770, 779 (Ct. App. 1974). See generally Robie, The Public
Interest in Water Rights Administration, 23 ROcKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 917
(1977).

167. Legislative authority for the reservation of jurisdiction was explicitly provided in
1959, CAL. WATER CODE § 1394 (West 1971), although the practice predates that
statute as noted, for example, in United States v. State Water Resources Control
Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 128 n.22, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 186 n.22 (Ct. App. 1986).
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priations of the CVP and the SWP,1 68 insofar as they impacted on the
delta. And in recent litigation in which the validity of this practice
was questioned, the California Court of Appeal approved the
169
SWRCB's action.
In one respect, the decision on the delta water cases is quite different from Pasadena.11 0 In the latter case groundwater pumpers initiated uses pursuant to rules of law which gave them a preferred
position, but they found their priority was nullified by the court's desire to impose an equitable solution through adoption of the mutual
prescription doctrine. 1 71 In the delta water cases, user expectations
were not thwarted in the same way, because the appropriators' rights
were defined from the beginning in a way that avoided priority. Nor
were there established junior users analogous to the City of Pasadena
seeking to escape from the consequences of the priority principle. In
both situations, however, the important point is that the no-sharing
rule characteristic of prior appropriation was replaced by a sharing
rule which reflects a form of state equitable apportionment of water

resources.
C.

The Reasonableness Cases

Nearly eighty years ago the great water law scholar Samuel Wiel
identified as a minority line of authority in western water law what he
called "the principle of unreasonable priority."172 He suggested that
this principle, likely to grow in importance over time, 73 was "shaping
the law of appropriation into a discretionary system, with power in the
Chancellor to apply his ideas of fairness whenever priorities would
work injustice because of complication of the history of claims, or because of selfish results of enforcing them."174 He thought this discretion reflected "the community idea" that required "an equitable corelation of [water] users for the common good."' 1 75
Wiel acknowledged that often the reasonableness cases merely put
168. Even though jurisdiction was not explicitly reserved for all of the CVP's many
units, "[a]s long as the Board had reserved jurisdiction... in at least one of the
[CVP] permits, it retained the power and jurisdiction to 'coordinate' the permits
and impose similar conditions upon all." Id. at 129, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
169. Id- at 131-33, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 188-90.
170. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 99-123.
172. Wiel, "'riority"in Western Water Law, 18 YALE L.J. 189, 198 (1909).
173. Id. ("likely to be a growing doctrine as the irrigated regions become more closely
settled").
174. IM.
175. Id at 194. These observations may also be found at I S. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN
THE WESTERN STATES §§ 310-315 (3d ed. 1911). "Equitable co-relation" of water

users obviously evokes the sharing element of riparianism, and it should be noted
Wiel has been portrayed as generally supportive of riparianism against prior appropriation. Davis, supra note 12, at 35.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:76

limits on the waste or misuse of water, and they did not put aside the
priority principle itself.176 But he cited other cases in which the court
"ignored priorities and proceeded simply to an equitable apportionment among all."177 He noted that this was done "in order to reach
17 8
justice among large communities."
Today the notion that appropriators as well as riparians are limited
to reasonable beneficial use of water is well entrenched in western
water law,179 and in fact in California the idea has been given constitutional expression.18 0 This evolution in prior appropriation is important, particularly as we search today for greater efficiency in our water
law, but generally it is a modification, not an abandonment, of the priority principle. The priorities for those with egregiously wasteful uses
are unprotected, but those who pass the minimal efficiency threshold
imposed by courts find that priority still applies.18 1
Occasionally, however, a reasonableness case is reported which is
reminiscent of the decisions which interested Wiel. One example occurred eleven years ago when the California Court of Appeal sorted
out water rights among vineyardists in the famed Napa Valley in Peo82
ple ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board v. Forni.1
Frost protection is a serious problem for Napa Valley grape growers. For many years they used orchard heaters to warm the air, but in
the late 1960s and early 1970s many growers switched to the use of
water.1 8 3 Vines that are sprayed with a fine mist can tolerate lower
ambient temperatures than those that are not,18 4 so many growers
sought access to water for frost protection.
Difficulties arose because the common source of water for frost
protection purposes was the Napa River, which consists mainly of runoff from rain. Normally rains come with warmer weather, not the
cold snaps, so the river typically is low when water is most needed for
frost protection. High instantaneous demand at two o'clock a.m. on a
cold spring morning in the Napa Valley might lead to a virtually dry
river bed.
When some of the newer vineyardists applied to the SWRCB for
appropriations for frost protection, the board devised a plan to allow
extensive use of Napa River water for frost protection without drying
Wiel, supra note 172, at 193-94.
Id- at 196.
IdDunning, supra note 11, at 448-58.
CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (1928, amended 1974; formerly at art. XIV, § 3).
Dunning, supra note 11, at 448-58.
54 Cal. App. 3d 743, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851 (Cal. App. 1976).
A WINKLER, J. COOK, W. KLIEWER & L. LIDER, GENERAL VITICULTURE 406, 492
(1974).
184. DIVISION OF AGRIC. SCL, UNIV. OF CALM., FROST PROTECTION FOR NORTH COAST
VINEYARDS 3 (1975) (Leaflet 2743).

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
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up the river. The key was the construction of storage, 8 5 so in a cold
snap reservoirs would be drawn down and the river preserved for reservoir replenishment later on.
In addition to imposing this plan on appropriators through terms
and conditions, 8 6 the SWRCB took legal action to impose it on Napa
Valley riparians. The board's legal vehicle was the constitutional reasonableness requirement, 8 7 which extends to methods of diversion as
well as to uses of water.
The Napa Valley riparians resisted on the ground their rights were
paramount to those of the appropriators, their method of use was reasonable and the board had no authority to prevent them from engaging in direct diversion for frost protection or to compel them to build
storage. 8 8 But after the trial court granted judgment on the pleadings
for the riparians, the court of appeal reversed. It held the board's
complaint stated a cause of action and the case should proceed to trial
on the factual question of the reasonableness under the circumstances
of the riparians' use of water by direct diversion. 8 9
The Forni decision might be viewed as simply one in a series of
reasonableness cases, in which, if the claimant has an unreasonable
use or method of use, his priority or method of use is unprotected but
185. The regulation applicable to SWRCB permittees then prohibited the grant of permits for the appropriation of Napa River water after March 15 for frost protection
except to replenish winter storage and where a water distribution program had
been established. CAL. ADMvN. CODE tit. 23, § 659 (1985) as reprinted in STATE
WATER REsOuRCEs CONTROL BD., REPORT ON NAPA VALLEY TRIAL DIsmmuION

186.
187.
188.
189.

PROGRAM 1 (1986). In 1972, however, the SWRCB adopted a resolution whereby
participation in the distribution program alone would be accepted as compliance.
Id (reflected in 1979 amendment; CAL. ADmIN. CODE tit. 23 § 659 (1985)). Thus,
from 1972 until the present there has been no ban on nonreplenishment diversion, since enough storage has been built on a voluntary basis. STATE WATER
REsOURcEs CONTROL BD., supra, at B-2 (table shows those with substantial acreage have sufficient reservoir capacity). During these years, periods of low
streamflow and sustained frost have not occurred, icL at 4, and most Napa River
frost protection diversions have been for storage replenishment. See, e.g., id at 5.
CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, § 659, discussed supra note 185.
CAL. CONsT. art. X, § 2 (1928, amended 1974; formerly at art. XIV, § 3).
People ex reL State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Forni, 54 Cal. App. 3d 743,
751, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851, 856 (1976).
Id at 754, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 858. Later in 1976 the suit was settled by a stipulated
judgment which requires the defendants to participate in a trial distribution program. STATE WATER RESOuRCEs CONTROL BD., supra note 185, at 2. This judgment requires among other things that the defendants comply with the orders of
a SWRCB-appointed watermaster, who allots the available water and controls the
amount, rate and times of pumping by the defendants; install meters to measure
both their instantaneous pumping rate and the cumulative volume of water
pumped; allow the watermaster reasonable access to their property for inspection
purposes; and reimburse the SWRCB for their proportional share of the actual
expense of the watermaster service. People ex reL State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Forni, No. 31785 (Cal. Super. Ct., Napa County, Dec. 29, 1976).
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the priority principle itself is respected. Yet the SWRCB claimed and
the court accepted that what was unreasonable about direct diversion
was not inefficiency in the sense of use of significant quantities of
water bringing no or marginal benefits. 190 Rather, the unreasonableness came from the fact that direct diversion during the critical periods would result in "great temporary scarcity of water."191
The interesting aspect of this observation is that any use of water
by one with a better priority can produce a scarcity for others. Even in
the impossible situation of 100% irrigation efficiency-all the water
diverted taken up by the crop for consumptive use-use by one could
create scarcity for another. In Forni apparently the construction of
storage together with a distribution program managed by a
watermaster relieved the pressure, but what if no such solution had
been at hand? Should scarcity then have been dealt with by abandoning priority and engaging in a sharing of the limited resource?
Forni did not so provide,192 but it seems a plausible next step in seeking a community solution to a community problem.
Confirmation that, at least in California, the reasonableness limitation on water rights sometimes permits an agency or court to substitute sharing for no-sharing is suggested by language in the recent
Court of Appeal decision in the delta water rights litigation discussed
above. 193 In its analysis of the authority of the SWRCB to modify appropriators' permits in order to enforce water quality control standards, the court stated:
Obviously, some accommodation must be reached concerning the major public
interests at stake: the quality of valuable water resources and transport of
adequate supplies for needs southward. The decision is essentially a policy
judgment requiring a balancing of the competing public interests, one the
Board is uniquely qualified to make in view of its special knowledge and exallocate the rights to, and
pertise and its combined statewide responsibility1 9to
4
to control the quality of, state water resources.

That language served as the foundation for the judicial determination that the SWRCB properly imposed joint responsibility on the
190. By way of contrast, in California's leading reasonableness case, the court stated
that to use stream water to carry "mere sand and gravel... subserves no public
policy." Joslin v. Main Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 141-42,429 P.2d 889, 895,
60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 383 (1967) (emphasis in original).
191. People ex reL State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Forni, 54 Cal. App. 3d 743,
750, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851, 855 (Ct. App. 1976).
192. Nor does the stipulated judgment, which includes the following- "Appropriators
having nonriparian vineyards will be allowed to pump for this land only when
streamflow is in excess of riparian direct diverters' and riparian storage replenishment diverters' requirements including replenishment of reservoirs serving riparian lands." People ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Forni, No.
31785 (Cal. Super. Ct., Napa County, Dec. 29, 1976).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 169-71.
194. United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 131, 227
Cal. Rptr. 161, 188 (Ct. App. 1986).
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CVP and the SWP to ensure appropriate salinity control in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and in Suisun Marsh.195 In that situation,
the SWRCB acted pursuant to jurisdiction reserved by the permits'
terms to allow coordination of project activities. 9 6
Even where jurisdiction has not been reserved, however, the
SWRCB and the courts have continuing authority pursuant to constitutional and statutory provisions to make judgments on reasonableness. 197 Sometimes these judgments deprive a type of use or method

of use of water of any protection,198 a result which is arguably consistent with the priority principle. But in other situations it seems the
"accommodation" to which the Court of Appeal made reference in the
delta water cases decision could include protection of competitors on
some egalitarian basis in order to "strike the proper balance."199 Or,
in Wiel's words, to provide "justice among large communities" by
means of equitable apportionment. 200
VI.

EQUITY IN FEDERAL CASES

Readers will doubtless have noticed that my examples of what I
have called "state equitable apportionment" come from California.
Furthermore, they all could be explained entirely in more conventional terms, as examples of prescription or conditional rights or limitations on waste. To the extent the less conventional explanation in
terms of equity is persuasive, one could think that the story is simply
one of California water law craziness--deviant behavior of merely academic interest in the rest of the West. Adherents of an uncompromising devotion to prior appropriation in other western states could take
195. 1& at 132, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
196. 1&t at 127-29, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 185-87.
197. CAL. CoNsT. art. X, § 2 (1928, amended 1974; formerly at art. XIV, § 3); CAL.
WATER CODE §§ 100, 275 (West 1971); CAL. ADMN. CODE tit. 23, § 761(a) (1985);

United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82,129, 227
Cal. Rptr. 161, 187-88 (Ct. App. 1986). But the courts are responsible for "the
ultimate adjudication of reasonableness." People ex reL State Water Resources
Control Bd. v. Forni, 54 Cal. App. 3d 743, 752, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851, 857 (Ct. App.
1976).
198. In re Alleged Waste, Unreasonable Use, Method of Use or Method of Diversion of
Water by Mission Viejo Company, California State Water Resources Control
Board, Decision 1463 (March 1977) (no protection for filling of an artificial lake
during a period of severe drought; but filling with degraded groundwater subsequently approved in a modification of the decision in a connected case by the
same name. California State Water Resources Control Board, Decision 1469
(June 1977)); Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 141-42, 429 P.2d
889, 895, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 383 (1967) (no protection for use of water to carry sand
and gravel).
199. United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 130, 227
Cal. Rptr. 161, 188 (Ct. App. 1986).
200. Wiel, supra note 172, at 196.
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comfort in recalling California's "softness" on priority in continuing to
give a significant place to the riparian water right.
In evaluating the California cases I have discussed, it may be helpful to consider also some possible parallels in water law decisions from
the United States Supreme Court. One is the celebrated decision in
Arizona v. California,201 which involved interstate allocation of the
lower Colorado River. Until that decision, there were only two accepted means for such an allocation: an agreement among the riparian states manifested by an interstate compact approved by the
Congress and an equitable apportionment by the United States
202
Supreme Court.
In Arizona v. California,203the Court put aside the existing doctrine on the settlement of interstate water controversies and announced that a third means of dividing an interstate river is
apportionment by Congress. 2 0 4 Furthermore, in a most doubtful exercise in statutory construction, 205 the Court decided that Congress had
in fact established in the Boulder Canyon Project Act a mechanism for
the allocation of the lower Colorado River between Arizona, Califor20 6
nia and Nevada.
Arizona v. California,207like City of Pasadenav. City of Alhambra,208 can be and normally is understood simply as doctrinal evolution. On the other hand, if the result of judicial action is to avoid the
harshness which results from application of the priority principle, one
can properly ask if the governing principle is the new bit of doctrine or
possibly an unstated notion that equity in some cases is a better guide
than priority. There is no compact for the lower Colorado, so if the
conventional wisdom on interstate water controversies had been followed the Court would have engaged in an equitable apportionment,
but with priority still the "guiding principle." 209 This would likely
have greatly favored California over Arizona, 210 with little interstate
201. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
202. As noted earlier by one of the West's leading water lawyers, "it is doubtful if
Congress has any authority to establish a principle for the settlement of an interstate stream controversy." Bannister, InterstateRights in InterstateStreams in
the Arid West, 36 HARV. L. REV. 960, 963 (1923).
203. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
204. The constitutional basis for this congressional authority was unexplained by the
Court but is discussed in Trelease, Arizona v. California: Allocation of Water
Resources to People, States, and Nation, 1963 SuP. CT. REV. 158, 176-83.
205. Clyde, The Colorado River Decision - 1963, 8 UTAH L. REV. 299, 308-10 (1964).
206. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 575-90 (1963). The theory was Congress by the
act authorized the Secretary of the Interior by contract to apportion the river in
accordance with certain congressional guidelines. 1d.
207. Id
208. 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949).
209. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
210. One difficulty for California, regardless of congressional apportionment, was the
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sharing of the consequences of an inadequate supply in the river.
By way of contrast, the Court's decision has allowed development
of a major Colorado River project for the benefit of Central Arizona, 211 although that region remains very short of water. At the
same time, it has required California to plan for some cutbacks in its
Colorado River diversions, 212 and in particular it has required the urban areas of Southern California to look elsewhere for additional
water supplies.2 13 It is perhaps relevant that in 1963, when the Court
decided the case, Southern California's prospects for water from
sources other than the Colorado appeared much brighter than central
214
Arizona's.
Some might say, of course, that decisions such as City of Pasadena
v. City of Alhambra215 and Arizona v. California216 are "one-of-akind,"217 and consequently they should not be taken that seriously
when general theories on water allocation are advanced. Perhaps so,
but there comes a point when enough "one-of-a-kind" cases are discovered to suggest that Wiel was right:21 8 if priority is the major theme in
western water law, equity is increasingly the minor theme and deserves to be recognized as such.
fact that pursuant to a requirement of the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928,
§ 4, 43 U.S.C. § 617c(a) (1986), it had limited its claim to consumptive use of water
of and from the Colorado River to 4.4 million acre feet of the water apportioned
to the lower basin by the Colorado River Compact, plus up to one-half of any
surplus unapportioned by that compact. 1929 Cal. Stat. ch. 15 at 37. California
sought to minimize the impact of this limitation by arguing that in the project act
and in its own legislation "water of and from the Colorado River" included both
mainstream and tributary water. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 567 (1963).
Inclusion of tributary water, rejected by the Court in the context of congressional
apportionment, id., would have resulted in much more surplus water in the mainstream to be divided equally between California and Arizona. Wilmer, Arizona v.
California, A Statutory Construction Case, 6 ARIz. L. REV. 40, 53 (1964).
211. The Central Arizona Project, now nearing completion, will serve the Phoenix
and Tucson areas. Getches, supra note 93, at 449.
212. THE CALIFORNIA WATER ATLAs, supra note 67, at 45.

213. The major new source has been Northern California. See supra text accompanying note 152.
214. "Something in the human viscera, if not in the human intelligence, refuses to
accept a solution which calls for returning to desert [in Arizona] that which men
have reclaimed from the desert. California, moreover, had an alternative supply
of water within California." Corker, Save the Columbia River for Posterity or
What Has PosterityDonefor You Lately?, 41 WASH. L. REv. 838, 841 (1966) (au-

215.
216.
217.
218.

thor an attorney for California in the Colorado River litigation). The Special
Master in the case had sustained California's objections to Arizona's evidence on
the equities of the situation. Id.
33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949).
373 U.S. 546 (1963).
See J. SAx & R. ABRAMS, supra note 13, at 830 (asks if Pasadenais a "one-of-akind decision" and if the doctrine of mutual prescription is "an ex post facto rationale manufactured to suppori a palatable resolution of the particular case").
See supra text accompanying notes 172-78.
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In the United States Supreme Court water law jurisprudence, another major decision which functions as a sort of equitable apportionment is United States v. New Mexico,219 the Court's most recent major
pronouncement on the troublesome subject of the federal reserved
right.220 This decision broke with the general expansionist tendency
in the reserved right decisions from 1908 to 1976,221 and held that federal reserved rights for the use of water on a national forest exist only
for the primary uses of that forest,222 at least insofar as those rights

are created by the National Forest Organic Act.223 Thus, for timber
production and watershed protection, water is available to the national forests pursuant to their organic legislation; but for maintenance of fish and wildlife habitat, stock watering and other purposes
resort must be had to state law.224
United States v. New Mexico225 by its terms is entirely consistent
with the priority principle and makes no explicit reference to equity.
Federal law reserved rights have a particular priority, in this case 1899
when the Gila National Forest was established in New Mexico. 226 The
"primary use" principle defines the scope of the federal reserved right.
Any use not within the scope of the federal right must be provided for
pursuant to state law, which-if it allows a right for such a use at
all227-will provide its own priority date. "First-in-time, first-in-right"

is intact, and there is no obvious element of equitable apportionment.
The ease with which United States v. New Mexico 228 can be assimilated to the conventional priority system should not cause one to ignore certain other elements in the decision. The Court's opinion
shows great sensitivity to the disruption federal reserved rights could
cause for those who rely on junior state law rights2 2 -rights oftentimes created when there was no hint the federal reserved right extended to more than Indian reservations. 2 30 This is the problem of the
219.
220.
221.
222.

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

228.
229.
230.

438 U.S. 696 (1978).
See supra text accompanying notes 58-65.
See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978) (water necessary to fulfill
"the very purpose" of a federal reservation is reserved, but not water "only valuable for a secondary use.")
See supra note 59 (reserved rights in designated wilderness areas).
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 707-18 (1978).
IdId at 698.
Some states do not permit appropriative water rights for uses as to which there is
no physical control of the water by the appropriator. Fullerton v. State Water
Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 590, 600-02, 153 Cal. Rptr. 518, 525-26 (Ct.
App. 1979); California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal.
App. 3d 816, 153 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1979).
438 U.S. 696 (1978).
Id. at 699.
"At no time prior to 1955 did I ever hear a suggestion that the reserved rights

19871

EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT

dormant right, a situation in which, when a river is fully appropriated,
"federal reserved water rights will frequently require a gallon-for-gallon reduction in the amount of water available for water-needy state
and private appropriators."'231 A way to minimize the need for this
reduction and in effect to achieve some rough equity in apportioning
the benefits of the river between the federal agency and established
state law appropriators is to develop a doctrine of primary uses. In a
broad way the result is a sharing of shortage analogous to that in City
of Pasadenav. City of Alhambra;23 2 but unlike the Pasadena court,
the Court in the reserved right case includes in its opinion no discussion of the benefits of abandoning priority for equity.
Western water rights specialists from outside California might still
wonder, conceding that perhaps Arizona v. California and United
States v. New Mexico do bear some functional similarity to City of
Pasadenav. City of Alhambra and to the other California equitable
apportionment cases, what advantages departures from priority might
offer their states. If the root problem which leads courts to abandon
priority for equity is overappropriation in respect to actual uses in normal water years, it might seem a better response would be to confront
the overappropriation rather than to abandon priority. As noted
above, construction of projects is one means of confrontation. Colorado has taken that process a step further with its "plan for augmentation," which can provide a mix of projects, exchanges, physical
solutions and other options.233 In what situation, one might ask,
would a state as devoted to the priority principle as Colorado be
tempted to abandon it?
One possibility exists with regard to Indian reserved water rights.
Unlike most of the federal law rights for non-Indian reservations,
these may involve large amounts of water 2 34-quantities which, if actually put to beneficial use over the next several generations, could
damage substantial economies based on junior water rights. New
projects are unlikely to save those economies, and plans for augmentation may be of limited benefit. Some sort of equitable apportionment
with sharing of available supplies between the established juniors and
seniors and the Indians would, however, help the established users.
And to the extent such allocation facilitates the settlement of longstanding Indian water claims, it might help the latter get the political

231.
232.
233.
234.

doctrine was anything but a special quirk of Indian water law." Trelease, supra
note 64, at 475.
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 705 (1978).
33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949).
CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-302(5) (1973); see generally Dunning, supra note 11, at
466-67 and 475-77.
Shupe, supra note 64, at 566 (tribes hold "vast tracts of potentially irrigable lands
... and the associated water rights [are] correspondingly enormous").
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235
approval needed to obtain projects for the use of their water.
Western states with a tradition of unbroken devotion to priority in
the non-Indian context may find it difficult to justify a sudden concern
for equity only in those cases where Indian water rights are involved.
To avoid charges of discrimination against the Indians, they may need
to demonstrate that in non-Indian as well as Indian cases, they are
ready in appropriate situations to temper the harshness of priority
with principles designed to provide fairness overall-the "justice
among large communities" for which Wiel called.236 One way to do
this is to incorporate in their domestic system some principle of equitable apportionment of water resources.

VII.

CONCLUSION

Water in the West is the subject of a unique legal regime. Although
the resource is commonly said to be owned by the public or the
state,237 it is subject to extensive private use rights. By and large these
private rights are founded on priority of appropriation for reasonable
beneficial use. This priority principle remains today the dominant notion in the allocation of water resources to those who make use of our
rivers and lakes, even though where they are water wholesalers or
retailers they typically treat their customers on a more egalitarian
238
basis.
Doubtless it is true that the priority principle itself reflects a judgment about fairness or equity.2 39 Difficulties arise, however, when in
various circumstances juniors with important established uses must be
wholly denied water in order fully to honor earlier appropriations.
This creates stress for the prior appropriation system, and it sometimes leads to deviation from the priority principle itself. These departures from priority can collectively be regarded as state equitable
apportionment of water resources.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See generally id.
See supra text accompanying note 178.
1 W. HUTCHINS, supra note 43, at 5-6.
See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
Indeed, the leading early prior appropriation case described the priority principle
as a "maxim of equity." Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 147 (1855).
[W]hen a person has taken, used, become accustomed to, and made a livelihood from water, it becomes "his water," and.., one who takes it from
him has "stolen his water." I used to think that prior appropriation was
an American invention, but now I am convinced it was simply the verbal
identification of a very widespread human trait.
Trelease, New Water Legislation: Draftingfor Development, Efficient Allocation and Environmental Protection, 12 LAND & WATER L. REv. 385, 414 (1977).

"The rule of priority is not as harsh as it sounds. It guarantees a firm supply to
The junior appropriator is enall those for whom the supply is sufficient ....
couraged by this law to develop water resources." Trelease, supra note 204, at
187.
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As time passes and the problems with prior appropriation become
ever more apparent, instances of state equitable apportionment are
likely to increase in frequency. Ultimately they represent a partial
reintroduction into western water law of the concept of riparianism
that users should share water resources and absorb the burden of
shortage in a proportional way. In the words of Samuel Wiel, equitable apportionment like common law riparianism provides a vehicle for
allowing water users what is "reasonable under all the
circumstances." 240

240. Wiel, supra note 172, at 198 (emphasis added).

